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Lobbying as a Strategy for Tribal Resilience
Kirsten Matoy Carlson*
Indian tribes have endured as separate governments despite the
taking of their land, the forced relocation of their people, and the
abrogation of their treaty rights. Many threats to tribal existence have
stemmed from federal policies aimed at assimilating Indians into
mainstream American society. In crafting these policies, members of
Congress often relied on the input of non-Indians, including the Bureau
of Indian Affairs. As a result, American Indians were largely left out of
the federal policy–making process. This started to change in the 1970s
when Congress adopted the Tribal Self-Determination Policy, which
encouraged tribal participation in the creation of federal Indian policy.
Tribes have responded to this opening of the political process by
increasingly lobbying Congress. This Article explores how tribes have
used legislative strategies to influence federal Indian policy. It demonstrates how tribes have used lobbying as a way to build resilience over
time by influencing the development of federal Indian policies that
protect tribal sovereignty. This Article emphasizes the role of American
Indian voices in federal policy–making and shows how tribes have used
legislative advocacy to initiate new policies, to reverse court decisions,
and to oversee the implementation of existing policies. In conclusion, this
Article considers some of the implications of this research for federal
Indian law and interest group and advocacy studies more generally.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Today, tribal police cars cruise most reservations, tribal health
departments offer traditional and Western-style medical care to
tribal members; tribal departments of natural resources monitor
environmental quality standards and manage natural resources;
tribal education programs teach children in their native languages; and tribal courts exercise jurisdiction over child welfare
cases, disputes between members, and misdemeanor crimes.1
But fifty years ago, Indian nations did not look like this.2 Few
viable tribal institutions existed. The federal government administered social, educational, and welfare programs in Indian country.3
Most Indian nations did not have their own police forces, courts, or
1. Programs and services vary greatly by tribe.
2. See Reid Peyton Chambers, Reflections on the Changes in Indian Law, Federal Indian

Policies and Conditions on Indian Reservations Since the Late 1960s, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 729, 733–36
(2014) (describing Indian country in the 1960s).
3. See id. at 734 (noting that the Bureau of Indian Affairs “controlled many, perhaps
most, actions by tribes and reservation Indians”).
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health clinics.4 If they had them at all, the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA) or the Indian Health Service (IHS) ran them.5 Living
conditions in many Indian communities were deplorable. In
Michigan, for example, Indians lived in homes insulated with
newspaper and cardboard, heated by wood stoves, and without
running water well into the 1970s.6
Indians not only survived these hardships but they thrived at
the end of the twentieth century, experiencing a renaissance in
tribal sovereignty, institution building, culture, and economic
development.7 Tribes have demonstrated tremendous resilience,
or ability to adapt in the face of adversity.8 For centuries, Indians
have faced formidable threats to their existence from outsiders
who have sought to occupy their lands, develop their natural
resources, and destroy their cultures.9 Many of these threats came
from policies sanctioned by the United States government.10

4. See, e.g., Donald L. Fixico, Witness to Change: Fifty Years of Indian Activism and
Tribal Politics, in BEYOND RED POWER: AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICS AND ACTIVISM SINCE
1900, at 2, 8 (Daniel M. Cobb & Loretta Fowler eds., 2007) (“During the first fifty years of
the twentieth century, Native people had limited influence. The Bureau of Indian Affairs
controlled their lives. As we say, BIA stood for ‘Boss Indians Around.’”).
5. Id.; Chambers, supra note 2, at 734; Warren H. Cohen & Philip J. Mause, Note, The
Indian: The Forgotten American, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1818, 1820 (1968) (“Although the normal
expectation in American society is that a private individual or group may do anything
unless it is specifically prohibited by the government, it might be said that the normal
expectation on the reservation is that the Indians may not do anything unless it is
specifically permitted by the government.”).
6. See MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, THE EAGLE RETURNS: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE
GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA AND CHIPPEWA INDIANS 166 (2012).
7. See, e.g., STEPHEN CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE: AMERICAN INDIAN
POLITICAL RESURGENCE (1988); JOANE NAGEL, AMERICAN INDIAN ETHNIC RENEWAL: RED
POWER AND THE RESURGENCE OF IDENTITY AND CULTURE (1996); REBUILDING NATIVE
NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 27 (Miriam Jorgensen ed.,
2007); THE HARVARD PROJECT ON AM. INDIAN ECON. DEV., THE STATE OF THE NATIVE
NATIONS: CONDITIONS UNDER U.S. P OLICIES OF SELF-DETERMINATION 1–13 (2008).
8. Patrice H. Kunesh, Constant Governments: Tribal Resilience and Regeneration in
Changing Times, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 8, 13–14 (2009).
9. Makere Stewart-Harawira, Indigenous Resilience and Pedagogies of Resistance:
Responding to the Crisis of Our Age, in RESILIENT SYSTEMS, RESILIENT COMMUNITIES 158, 159
(Jordan B. Kinder & Makere Stewart-Harawira eds., 2018).
10. See Kunesh, supra note 8, at 9–10; Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osborne,
The History, Status, and Future of Tribal Self-Governance Under the Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 6–16 (2014). For a discussion of these
policies, see DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (6th
ed. 2011).
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Yet for the past forty years, the federal government has
formally adhered to an Indian policy that scholars and tribal leaders have widely described as supportive of Indian nations as governments.11 The Tribal Self-Determination Policy emphasizes “the
development of strong and stable tribal governments, capable of
administering quality programs and developing the economies of
their respective communities.”12 Some scholars have praised it as
the most successful Indian affairs policy ever established by Congress.13 Scholars, however, have recently disagreed over whether
Congress continues to support the Tribal Self-Determination
Policy. While some have yet to see the era as over,14 others have
noted erosion of the policy with Reagan-style budget cuts.15 A few
have observed that federal Indian policy has shifted from selfdetermination to forced federalism.16 They claim that a new era in
indigenous politics started in 1988 with the enactment of the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and the devolution of federal
powers to state governments in the area of Indian affairs policy.17
This devolution, they argue, undermines the once exclusive
federal-tribal relationship by forcing tribes to enter into legal and
political relationships with states.18 Moreover, it reveals that
threats to Indian sovereignty and survival are on the rise again.
This disagreement over the current state of federal Indian
policy demonstrates the importance of non-Indigenous governments to the existence of tribal sovereignty.19 The impact of

11. See Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Self-Determination at the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L.
REV. 777, 781 (2006).
12. 25 U.S.C. § 5302(b) (2012).
13. See Washburn, supra note 11, at 781.
14. See, e.g., Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Congress and Indians, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 77
(2015) [hereinafter Congress and Indians]; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and
Federal Indian Policy, 85 NEB. L. REV. 121 (2006); Jacob T. Levy, Three Perversities of Indian
Law, 12 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 329 (2008).
15. See Dean J. Kotlowski, From Backlash to Bingo: Ronald Reagan and Federal Indian
Policy, 77 PAC. HIST. REV. 617, 621–28 (2008).
16. JEFF CORNTASSEL & RICHARD C. WITMER, FORCED FEDERALISM: CONTEMPORARY
CHALLENGES TO INDIGENOUS NATIONHOOD 5 (2008) [hereinafter FORCED FEDERALISM].
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Two Approaches to Development of Native
Nations: One Works, the Other Doesn’t, in REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR
GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 3, 27 (Miriam Jorgensen ed., 2007).

1162

001.CARLSON_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1159

5/6/19 2:14 PM

Lobbying as a Strategy for Tribal Resilience

congressional policy on Indian nations cannot be overstated. The
very survival of Indian nations depends upon their ability to
govern their people effectively by building institutions, promoting
sustainable economic development within their territories, and
protecting their distinctive ways of life.20 Yet Congress can and
historically has constrained their efforts.21 Congress exercises
plenary power over Indian tribes and can divest them of their
inherent authority at any time.22 As a result, to some extent, tribes
continually face threats to their existence. As history has repeatedly shown, congressional policies unsupportive of the tribal right
to self-determination undermine tribal sovereignty and the
survival of Indian peoples.23 This raises the question: How do
tribes remain resilient despite this constant threat?
This Article explores how Indian tribes have used lobbying to
protect their tribal sovereignty, build their institutions, and
maintain control over their lands and natural resources during the
Tribal Self-Determination Era. Part II inventories the literature on
tribal participation in U.S. politics.24 Historically underdeveloped,
this emerging literature has documented a dramatic increase in
reported lobbying by American Indians over the past thirty-five
years but has yet to explore how and why tribes use legislative strategies.25
Part II then seeks to fill the gap in the existing literature by
illuminating some of the various ways in which Indian nations
have used lobbying as a strategy for tribal resilience. By lobbying
to protect their status as sovereign governments, tribes promote
their cultural, economic, and political survival. This Article does
not offer a comprehensive account of all the possible ways tribes
employ lobbying as a strategy for tribal resilience, but it makes a
first attempt to investigate some of the various ways in which
tribes have used legislative strategies to protect their sovereignty.
It attempts to cumulate knowledge on tribal lobbying strategies by
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 18.
See Kunesh, supra note 8, at 9–10; Strommer & Osborne, supra note 10, at 1.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
See Kunesh, supra note 8, at 9–10; Strommer & Osborne, supra note 10, at 1.
See infra Part II.
See Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Lobbying Against the Odds, 56 HARV. J. LEGIS. 401, 403,
416–23 (2019) [hereinafter Lobbying Against the Odds].
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documenting three case studies and situating each within a
broader context. The cases show that Indian nations have used
legislative advocacy to advance tribal sovereignty by initiating
new policies, reversing court decisions, and encouraging the oversight and implementation of existing policies. Unlike previous
studies of lobbying by Indians at the federal level, this Article
connects lobbying efforts with their policy outcomes and attempts
to give voice to the role that Indians have played in the legislative
process.26 Thus, the case studies demonstrate how tribes have
harnessed strategies used by interest groups within the American
political system to advocate for federal Indian laws and policies
beneficial to them.
Part III aggregates and analyzes the data from the case studies
to demonstrate how tribes have employed lobbying as a strategy for
tribal resilience. The case studies emphasize the voices of Indian
nations as active participants in the political process, struggling to
retain their sovereign governments and distinctive ways of life.
Moreover, the cases when read together suggest that lobbying
strategies that encourage tribal resilience share common aspects: an
emphasis on protecting tribal sovereignty; persistence in tribal
lobbying efforts; sophistication and adaptability in tribal strategies;
and a commitment to building long-term, sustainable relationships.
In conclusion, Part IV considers some of the implications of
this descriptive research on tribal lobbying for federal Indian law
and interest group and advocacy studies more generally. This
exploratory research indicates that Congress is an important
venue for the crafting of federal Indian law. It emphasizes the
need for additional research into the success of tribal lobbying as a
strategy for advancing policies beneficial to, and opposing policies
detrimental to, Indian nations. The research also has implications
beyond federal Indian law and suggests that interest group and

26. See generally Frederick J. Boehmke & Richard Witmer, Indian Nations as Interest
Groups: Tribal Motivations for Contributions to U.S. Senators, 65 POL. RES. Q. 179 (2012) [hereinafter Tribal Motivations] (documenting tribal contributions to U.S. Senate campaigns);
Richard Witmer & Frederick J. Boehmke, American Indian Political Incorporation in the PostIndian Gaming Regulatory Act Era, 44 SOC. SCI. J. 127 (2007) [hereinafter Post-Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act Era] (finding an increase in American Indian use of interest group strategies
from 1997 to 2000).
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oversight theories may merit modification in light of the experiences of Indian nations.
II. ADVOCATING FOR SURVIVAL:
TRIBES AND FEDERAL INDIAN LAW AND POLICY
This Part explores some of the multiple ways in which tribes
and American Indian organizations have used legislative advocacy to influence federal Indian law and policy to protect tribal
sovereignty during the Tribal Self-Determination Era. Section II.A
summarizes existing knowledge about American Indian participation in the United States political system. It acknowledges a lack
of knowledge about how tribes engage in the legislative process.
Section II.B starts to address this gap in existing knowledge by
situating tribal legislative advocacy within its historical context as
part of a larger pattern of tribal advocacy. Section II.C then uses
three case studies to investigate some of the distinct ways in
which tribes have employed legislative advocacy to promote tribal
sovereignty through the creation and implementation of federal
Indian law and policy during the Tribal Self-Determination Era.
The cases demonstrate that Indian nations have used lobbying to
initiate new policies, to reverse court decisions, and to oversee the
implementation of existing policies. The more cumulative approach
to understanding Indian legislative advocacy used here provides
some useful, initial insights into how tribes use advocacy to
advance tribal sovereignty in the legislative process.
A. American Indian Participation in U.S. Politics
Most political scientists exclude American Indians from their
studies of American politics.27 As a result, the literature on political advocacy by Indian nations is scant and underdeveloped. The
dramatic increase in political activism at the end of the twentieth
century has encouraged political scientists, sociologists, and legal

27. See DAVID E. WILKINS & HEIDI KIIWETINEPINESIIK STARK, AMERICAN INDIAN
POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 170 (3d ed. 2011); Jeff J. Corntassel &
Richard C. Witmer, II, American Indian Tribal Government Support of Office-Seekers: Findings
from the 1994 Election, 34 SOC. SCI. J. 511 (1997) [hereinafter 1994 Election].
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scholars to study Indian advocacy.28 This growing field has
produced studies on individual Indians as voters in mainstream
elections,29 Indian protest movements after World War II,30
campaign contributions made by Indian nations involved in
gaming enterprises,31 and Indian engagement in state and local
politics.32 Many of these studies, however, have not considered
the legislative strategies used by Indian nations.33
The studies that do examine legislative advocacy by American
Indians often frame their research within the theoretical frameworks used by interest group scholars.34 They expect, and often
find, that American Indians act like organized interests.35 These
studies have documented the increased use of interest group
strategies, especially lobbying and campaign contributions, by
Indian tribes at the federal, state, and local levels.36 Aside from a
28. See generally CORNELL, supra note 7; NAGEL, supra note 7; Lobbying Against the
Odds, supra note 25.
29. See, e.g., DANIEL MCCOOL ET AL., NATIVE VOTE: AMERICAN INDIANS, THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT, AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE (2007); LAUGHLIN MCDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS
AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL VOTING RIGHTS (2011).
30. See, e.g., DANIEL M. COBB, NATIVE ACTIVISM IN COLD WAR AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY (2008); NAGEL, supra note 7; PAUL CHAAT SMITH & ROBERT ALLEN
WARRIOR, LIKE A HURRICANE: THE INDIAN MOVEMENT FROM ALCATRAZ TO WOUNDED
KNEE (1996).
31. See, e.g., 1994 Election, supra note 27; Tribal Motivations, supra note 26.
32. See, e.g., FORCED FEDERALISM, supra note 16; LAURA E. EVANS, POWER FROM
POWERLESSNESS: TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS, INSTITUTIONAL NICHES, AND AMERICAN
FEDERALISM (2011); KENNETH N. HANSEN & TRACY A. SKOPEK, THE NEW POLITICS OF INDIAN
GAMING: THE RISE OF RESERVATION INTEREST GROUPS (2015); W. DALE MASON, INDIAN
GAMING: TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000); Frederick J. Boehmke &
Richard Witmer, State Lobbying Registrations by Native American Tribes, 2015 POL. GROUPS &
IDENTITIES 633 (2015) [hereinafter State Lobbying Registrations].
33. For example, in his groundbreaking analysis of changes in collective action by
American Indians and Indian nations in the mid-twentieth century, Cornell considered the
different strategies used by American Indians and Indian nations, but he did not
systematically consider legislative strategies largely because Indian nations did not yet
have the resources to pursue them. See CORNELL, supra note 7.
34. See, e.g., HANSEN & SKOPEK, supra note 32; STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT & KATHRYN
R.L. RAND, INDIAN GAMING AND TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY: THE CASINO COMPROMISE (2005);
MASON, supra note 32; 1994 Election, supra note 27; State Lobbying Registrations, supra note 32.
35. Post-Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Era, supra note 26, at 129; State Lobbying
Registrations, supra note 32, at 5.
36. See, e.g., EVANS, supra note 32; HANSEN & SKOPEK, supra note 32, at 211–13; 1994
Election, supra note 27; State Lobbying Registrations, supra note 32; Tribal Motivations, supra
note 26, at 181; Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Making Strategic Choices: How and Why Indian Groups
Advocated for Federal Recognition from 1977 to 2012, 51 L. & SOC’Y REV. 930 (2017) [hereinafter
Making Strategic Choices].
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few case studies, most of these studies have not tried to connect
the lobbying efforts of tribes with policy outcomes.37 As a result,
these studies have not investigated the multiple ways in
which Indian nations may use the legislative process to influence
policy outcomes.
Scholars have conducted a few descriptive case studies of
legislative advocacy by Indian nations at the federal level.38 These
studies demonstrate how the advocacy efforts of tribes have
influenced policy outcomes in particular cases. Their focus on
either one issue or one Indian nation, however, limits the insights
they can provide about the legislative strategies used by Indian
nations more generally. The 573 Indian nations in the United
States may use legislative strategies for different purposes and in
diverse ways to influence federal Indian policy.39 The landscape of
advocacy in Indian country thus remains largely unknown. Case
studies are helpful, but in isolation they leave unanswered
37. See, e.g., Post-Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Era, supra note 26, at 129; State
Lobbying Registrations, supra note 32, at 5. For example, studies on campaign contributions
provide some insights into legislative advocacy by Indian nations, but they do not link
campaign contributions to specific policy proposals or evaluate the success of campaign
contributions as a strategy. See, e.g., Tribal Motivations, supra note 26, at 179.
38. See, e.g., MARGARET D. JACOBS, A GENERATION REMOVED: THE FOSTERING &
ADOPTION OF INDIGENOUS CHILDREN IN THE POSTWAR WORLD 127–61 (2014) (describing
Indian efforts to enact the Indian Child Welfare Act); Bethany R. Berger, United States v.
Lara as a Story of Native Agency, 40 TULSA L. REV. 5 (2004) (recounting Indian efforts to enact
legislation restoring tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians); Clayton W.
Dumont, Jr., Contesting Scientists’ Narrations of NAGPRA’s Legislative History: Rule 10.11 and
the Recovery of “Culturally Unidentifiable” Ancestors, 26 WICAZO SA REV. 5, 10 (2011)
(discussing the efforts of Indian nations, pantribal organizations, and Native Hawaiians to
secure passage of the Native American Graves and Repatriation Act); Patrick Haynal,
Termination and Tribal Survival: The Klamath Tribes of Oregon, 101 OR. HIST. Q. 270, 294–96
(2000) (recounting the efforts of the Klamath tribes of Oregon to regain federal recognition
congressionally from 1987 to 1990); Mark Miller, The Timbisha Shoshone and the National Park
Idea: Building Toward Accommodation and Acknowledgement at Death Valley National Park,
1933–2000, 50 J. SW. 415, 434–38 (2008) (describing the successful efforts of the Timbisha
Shoshone to obtain legislation providing them with homeland from 1994 to 2000). Some
scholars have also included short descriptions of Indian legislative advocacy on a
particular bill in articles focused on the bill and how it changed the law. See, e.g., Judith V.
Royster, Mineral Development in Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal Control over Mineral
Resources, 29 TULSA. L.J. 541, 582–84 (1993) (describing the tribal dissatisfaction with
mineral leasing on Indian lands leading up to the enactment of the Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982).
39. For example, one recent study found that 124 non-federally recognized Indian
groups used different legislative advocacy strategies in seeking federal recognition. Making
Strategic Choices, supra note 36, at 930–33.
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questions about variation among Indian nations in terms of
legislative approaches taken, issues of importance, and the kinds
and amounts of legislative activities. The next section starts to fill
this gap in the literature by situating tribal legislative advocacy
within a longer historical context.
B. Tribal Legislative Advocacy Past and Present
Indian nations have a long and rich history of engaging with
other governments.40 Indian tribes made alliances with one
another long before Europeans arrived in the Americas.41 They
started petitioning colonial governments almost as soon as
Europeans landed on American soil.42
Indians have not always been successful, but they have
continually attempted to influence non-Indigenous governments
to craft policies that recognize and protect their tribal sovereignty.
During the nineteenth century, Indian nations used the treatymaking process to retain their existing governmental and property
rights.43 Indian nations also petitioned and sent delegates to
40. See Daniel M. Cobb, Continuing Encounters: Historical Perspectives, in BEYOND RED
POWER: AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICS AND ACTIVISM SINCE 1900, at 57, 58 (Daniel M. Cobb &
Loretta Fowler eds., 2007); see also EDWARD LAZARUS, BLACK HILLS/WHITE JUSTICE: THE
SIOUX NATION VERSUS THE UNITED STATES, 1775 TO THE PRESENT (1991) (documenting over
two decades of Sioux advocacy for a congressional act authorizing the bringing of the Black
Hills claim in federal court); see generally FREDERICK E. HOXIE, THIS INDIAN COUNTRY:
AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND THE PLACE THEY MADE (2012). This section
adopts an encounters perspective for understanding the relationships between Indian and
non-Indian governments. Cobb, supra at 57. An encounters approach describes the
interactions among Indians and non-Indians as reciprocal and mutual rather than one
sided. Id. In contrast to earlier versions of these interactions, this approach emphasizes
Indians as active agents in their relations with non-Indians. Id.
41. BASIC CALL TO CONSCIOUSNESS 14 (Akwesasne Notes ed., 2005).
42. HERMAN J. VIOLA, DIPLOMATS IN BUCKSKINS: A HISTORY OF INDIAN DELEGATIONS
IN WASHINGTON CITY 13–21 (1995); Daniel Carpenter, On the Emergence of the Administrative
Petition: Innovations in Nineteenth-Century Indigenous North America, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
FROM THE INSIDE OUT: ESSAYS ON THEMES IN THE WORK OF JERRY L. MASHAW 349, 349
(Nicholas R. Parrillo ed., 2017).
43. See 1-1 PHILIP P. FRICKEY ET AL., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §
1.03[1] Lexis (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2017); INDIAN LAW RES. CTR., NATIVE LAND LAW
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW RELATING TO NATIVE LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
(lawyers ed. 2012). For example, Anishinaabek nations in present-day Wisconsin and
Minnesota negotiated the retention of their hunting, gathering, and fishing rights even
when they ceded lands to the United States government. Treaty with the Chippewa,
Chippewa Nation of Indians-U.S., July 29, 1837, 7 Stat. 536; see also Minnesota v. Mille Lacs
Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
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Washington, D.C., to meet with members of the executive branch
and Congress.44 They continued to petition and send delegations
to Washington, D.C., after Congress unilaterally terminated
treaty-making in 1871.45
Indian involvement in federal policy-making ebbed in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as members of Congress
and the executive branch prioritized the views of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs and other non-Indians over those of Indians in
crafting Indian affairs policy.46 Indian nations did not discontinue
their advocacy despite their lack of political influence. But they
faced tremendous obstacles and were unable to prevent Congress
from enacting the allotment and termination policies that sought
to destroy tribal organizations and assimilate American Indians
into mainstream American society.47
Even in these bleak times, some Indian nations overcame
powerful opposition to persuade Congress to enact legislation
beneficial to them.48 Other tribes resisted these congressional policies and managed to prevent the passage of legislation terminating their tribal existence or subjecting them to state jurisdiction.49
Indian activism gained publicity in the late 1960s and early
1970s with the rise of the civil rights movement. The Indian lobby,

44. HOXIE, supra note 40, at 70–71 (documenting Choctaw delegations to Washington, D.C., in the 1820s); MASON, supra note 32; Carpenter, supra note 42, at 349.
45. VIOLA, supra note 42, at 190–99.
46. EMMA R. GROSS, CONTEMPORARY FEDERAL POLICY TOWARD AMERICAN INDIANS
77 (1989).
47. CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS 66
(2005). Allotment and termination were two of the most detrimental Indian affairs policies
ever enacted by the United States Congress. The allotment policy undermined Indian
nations by allotting tribally held land into alienable fee simple properties held by
individual Indians and assimilating Indians into mainstream American culture as farmers.
See Dawes Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887), http://digital.library.okstate
.edu/kappler/Vol1/html_files/SES0033.html. The termination policy ended the political
and legal relationship between the United States and over 110 tribal governments,
liquidated tribal assets, and converted tribally held lands into fee simple properties. See
Termination Act of 1953, H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong. (1953).
48. For example, Congress returned Blue Lake to the Taos Pueblo in 1972.
WILKINSON, supra note 47, at 210–17.
49. For example, Indian advocacy prevented the termination of the Flathead
reservation in 1954, and the Sioux defeated efforts to extend PL 280 to them in 1964. Id. at
106, 123–25.
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however, remained weak.50 Indian nations had limited financial
resources and little experience in federal policy-making.51 A
confluence of factors—including changes in the political environment, the availability of resources, the development of political
capacity, and dramatic shifts in the receptivity of federal institutions toward Indian claims—would start to alter this in
the 1970s.52
As a result of these changes, reported lobbying by Indian
nations and organizations has dramatically increased since the
late 1970s.53 My earlier research documents an almost 700%
increase in reported lobbying by Indian nations from 1978 to
2012.54 Indian tribes have exhibited tremendous variation in their
reported lobbying over time. Some tribes have not reported
lobbying at all, while others have reported lobbying some years
but not others, and a few have lobbied almost every year.55 Some
tribes have also invested considerable amounts of money in
lobbying since 1997.56
Tribal governments lobby on a wide range of issues related to
the protection of their sovereignty. They have reported lobbying
on issues related to and beyond Indian affairs. Tribes have
reported lobbying on federal appropriations, taxation, transportation, and natural resources.57 They have testified before
congressional committees on a variety of issues, including agriculture, children and youth, claims, courts, culture, economic
development, education, employment, energy development, environmental regulations, federal recognition, gaming, health care,
housing, hunting and fishing, intergovernmental relations, land

50. GEORGE PIERRE CASTILE, TO SHOW HEART: NATIVE
AND FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY, 1960–1975, at 19 (1998).

AMERICAN SELF-DETERMINATION

51. The BIA had denied tribes the ability to use their own trust funds to finance
lobbying visits to Washington well into the late 1940s. Id. at xxiii–xxv.
52. Lobbying Against the Odds, supra note 25, at 406–07, 454.
53. Id. at 416–24.
54. Id. at 418.
55. Id. at 417–22.
56. Id. at 420–22. Data on lobbying expenditures made by tribes and tribal organizations
are not available before 1997.
57. Frederick J. Boehmke & Richard Witmer, Tribal Political Expenditures in California
and Washington DC, in THE NEW POLITICS OF INDIAN GAMING 25, 34 (Kenneth N. Hansen &
Tracy A. Skopek eds., 2011).
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(including land into trust), law enforcement, military, natural
resources, self-government, taxation, and welfare.
Recent studies demonstrate that Indian lobbying has increased
and suggest that tribes are extensively lobbying to influence
federal policy-making.58 This escalation in lobbying activities
raises significant questions about what tactics and strategies tribes
use and whether their lobbying efforts translate into changes to
substantive policy or its implementation.59 A few studies have
looked at how Indians advocate but none has considered the
range of ways in which tribes lobby. A 1989 study looked at
whether tribal lobbying contributed to the creation and implementation of the Tribal Self-Determination Policy.60 It found that
“[e]ffective lobbying by Indians was a very important source of
their influence on congressional policy development processes in
the seventies.”61 In discussing the role of Indian advocacy, the
study explained that congressional committees on Indian Affairs

58. See, e.g., Lobbying Against the Odds, supra note 25, at 416–23; Post-Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act Era, supra note 26, at 134–35.
59. Lobbying Against the Odds, supra note 25, at 458.
60. GROSS, supra note 46, at 75–92. Scholars generally disagree over the ability of
advocacy organizations, including social movements and interest groups, to facilitate
substantive law and policy change. See PAUL BURSTEIN, AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION,
ADVOCACY, AND P OLICY IN CONGRESS: WHAT THE PUBLIC WANTS AND WHAT IT GETS 6–16
(2014). While belief in advocacy group influence is high, little consensus exists about
whether advocacy organizations actually affect policy outcomes. Id.
Scholars have struggled to show empirically how groups influence legislators
through lobbying. See, e.g., FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BETH L. LEECH, BASIC INTERESTS: THE
IMPORTANCE OF GROUPS IN POLITICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 36 (1998) (“Scholars have long
attempted to observe and document the exercise of influence in politics. They have yet to
succeed.”). Aside from finding that interest groups protecting the status quo are the most
successful, empiricists have found that “it is difficult to find aspects of the policy
environment that consistently foreshadow policy change.” FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL.,
LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND WHY 221 (2009) [hereinafter
LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE]. Studies demonstrate that interest groups that are repeat
players engaged on an issue for a long time are more successful, but that the success of
interest group advocacy depends on a range of different factors, including presidential
support, the existence and strength of opposition, and congressional support. Id. at 236–38.
The applicability of these interest group theories to Indian lobbying, however, remains
largely unknown because large comprehensive studies of legislative advocacy omit Indian
nations and Indian issues. See, e.g., id. at 284 tbl.A.1 (not listing a single Indian issue among
the ninety-eight issues studied).
61. GROSS, supra note 46, at 83. Other factors identified as affecting policy change
included presidential support and support of the leadership of the Senate Committee on
Indian Affairs. Id. at 76.
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provide Indian advocates with unique, structural opportunities to
make their policy preferences known.62 It also indicated that
Indians who developed well-researched policy proposals, developed relationships with congressional staffers, and looked like
Indians (e.g., wore traditional clothing instead of business suits)
fared bettered in lobbying members of Congress.63 Another study,
which evaluated Indian policy influence on the state and local
level, found that Indian tribes succeeded politically by building
expertise and relationships with governmental actors over time.
The study highlighted the importance of relationship building by
advocates to gain governmental support and the development of
and commitment to a long-term, gradual plan for achieving and
implementing policy change.64 As such, it confirmed other interest
group studies finding that repeat players fared better in
influencing policy over time.65 The study did not, however, focus
on legislative lobbying by Indian nations.
The next section builds on this research by describing some of
the ways in which tribes have used legislative advocacy to
develop and implement federal Indian laws and policies that
protect tribal sovereignty. It neither offers a comprehensive
account of all the possible ways that tribes utilize lobbying as a
strategy nor does it attempt to fully explain why the policy
changes occurred.
C. Exploring Tribal Lobbying Strategies in the Era
of Tribal Self-Determination
This section uses multiple case studies to build on the existing
literature and provide a broader view of how tribes use lobbying
to influence policy development, enactment, and implementation.
These case studies are not representative nor exhaustive of all the
ways in which tribes lobby. Their purpose is to illustrate some of
the different ways in which tribes have used lobbying in their
attempts to influence policy-making to protect and promote tribal
sovereignty. The case studies do not fully evaluate whether tribes
62.
63.
64.
65.
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succeeded in influencing the policy-making process. Rather, the
thick description in each case provides context and deeper
understanding of how, when, and why tribes use lobbying
strategies. Multiple case studies allow for tentative, comparative
analysis across the cases. Three cases do not provide definitive
information, but they impart initial insights into possible trends or
patterns in tribal lobbying over time. They present an initial
description of the landscape of tribal advocacy at the federal level
and allow for the exploration and discovery of potential patterns
and trends in lobbying behaviors across cases.
1. Case selection and methodology
The cases presented here were selected from a larger database
of all Indian-related legislation introduced in the United States
Congress from 1975 to 2012.66 Preliminary analysis of 256 bills
with congressional hearings involving Indian advocacy suggested
that Indian nations use various lobbying strategies.67 The analysis
indicated that Indian tribes respond to threats to their sovereignty

66. Indian-related bills are defined as congressional bills with provisions involving
American Indians, Native Americans, Native Hawaiians, Alaska Natives, and their respective governments or organizations. For a more thorough discussion of Indian-related bills,
see Congress and Indians, supra note 14, at 82.
67. The original database included 7799 Indian-related bills introduced in the 94th
through the 112th Congresses. Id. at 77, 95–98. I collected and coded all the hearings from
the 539 bills with hearings in five congressional sessions (97th, 100th, 103rd, 106th, 109th).
These congressional sessions were selected because they are evenly spaced over time and
reflect variation in several important variables, including the party in control of Congress,
enactment rate, and enactment rate by bill type. Of these bills, 256 had hearings that
included testimony from an Indian witness. I defined an Indian witness as any witness
explicitly identifying as an Indian or testifying on behalf of an Indian tribe, an Indian
nonprofit organization, a tribal consortium, a tribal business, and/or an Alaska for-profit
or nonprofit corporation. Representatives of state, local, or federal agencies (e.g., BIA) were
not counted as Indian witnesses even if the witness identified as Indian and spoke to the
Indian issues in the bill because the witness was not representing Indians. For similar
reasons, I also excluded friends of the Indians, e.g., nonprofits that seek to assist Indians
but are not made up of Indians such as the Friends Committee on National Legislation.
When a hearing included at least one Indian witness, I coded all the testimony in the
hearing. If the hearing did not include any Indian witnesses, it was not coded. Each
legislative hearing, including the oral statements, responses to questions, and written
statements, were coded by the witness’s affiliation (e.g., tribe, tribal consortium, state, etc.);
the witness’s position on the bill (e.g., for, against, unclear); and the committee holding the
hearing. This coding scheme allowed me to identify and analyze the different strategies
and positions that Indians took on each bill.
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in two primary ways, either offensively by supporting Indianrelated policy proposals or defensively by opposing Indianrelated policy proposals. Both offensive and defensive strategies
can be further categorized into specific kinds of offensive and
defensive strategies.
The cases presented here are an initial attempt to improve
upon existing understandings of offensive strategies by distinguishing among the various ways in which Indians use them.
Offensive strategies were further subdivided into three categories
of ways in which Indian nations have employed lobbying to
encourage the enactment of federal Indian law and policies
beneficial to them: (1) to initiate policy change, (2) to reverse
judicial decisions, and (3) to oversee the implementation of
congressional policies.68 These categories reflect trends observed
by other scholars. The few scholars investigating Indian lobbying
have focused on Indian efforts to initiate policy change, suggesting the relevancy of that category. Similarly, federal Indian law
scholars have increasingly examined efforts of Indian nations to
reverse judicial decisions.69 The third category emerges from a gap
in the existing literature, which has yet to explore the role of
Indian advocacy in congressional oversight of federal Indian law
and policy. These categories are not meant to be definitive or
exhaustive but to provide a framework for investigating offensive
strategies used by tribes.
Cases were then selected within each category to explore that
particular strategy. To allow for exploration of lobbying behaviors
over time, each case chosen occurs in a slightly different time
period.70 The cases were also selected to vary in terms of subject
matter and type of bill as a way to investigate what role, if any,
subject matter and bill type play in lobbying strategies. The
purpose of the research was not to evaluate lobbying outcomes, so

68. Tribes often employ advocacy efforts for multiple reasons, which overlap and are
not necessarily mutually exclusive. Making Strategic Choices, supra note 36, at 948–58. For
example, Indian groups lobbying Congress for federal recognition often sought to influence
agency-congressional dynamics and educate the public as well as persuade members of
Congress to recognize them legislatively. Id.
69. Berger, supra note 38, at 12; Nell Jessup Newton, Permanent Legislation to Correct
Duro v. Reina, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 109, 110 (1992).
70. Some overlap exists as the ISDEAA efforts have spanned almost forty years.
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less attention was paid to the outcomes in the cases. In each case,
however, Indian tribes appear to have achieved at least some of
their goals. All of the cases were chosen because scholars had not
previously analyzed the lobbying efforts in them.71
Several limits exist to these case studies. First, they are not
generalizable. Case selection was not random nor meant to be representative. Second, the case studies do not provide a definitive or
exhaustive list of how tribes use lobbying to promote their
interests and resist policies detrimental to them.72 Third, the case
studies were only selected from pantribal and general bills even
through tribes have lobbied on tribe-specific bills as well.73 Thus,
they do not present any information on how and when tribes
advocate for tribe-specific bills even though tribes have used tribespecific bills to initiate policy change, overturn court decisions,
and encourage legislative oversight.74 Finally, the case studies
only explore lobbying within the era of Tribal Self-Determination
from 1975 to the present. The case studies, thus, do not provide

71. I intentionally chose not to include the Duro fix because scholars have extensively
written about it. I included the ISDEAA even though scholars have examined implementation of it because the existing accounts do not focus on the role of tribal advocacy in
implementation efforts.
72. For example, a full discussion of tribal strategies opposing legislation detrimental
to their interests is beyond the scope of this Article, which focuses on tribes using lobbying
to initiate policies, overturn court decisions, and encourage legislative oversight. Tribes,
however, have also opposed legislation detrimental to their interests. See, e.g., Internet
Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 3125 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms.,
Trade, & Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 59 (2000) (testimony of
Richard Williams, Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians) (opposing
the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 2000 because it would make gaming that is legal
under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act illegal); Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments;
and to Permit the Leasing of Oil and Gas Rights on Navajo Allotted Lands: Joint Hearing on S.
1315 and H.R. 3181 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs and the H. Comm. on Res., 106th Cong.
56 (1999) (testimony of Indian Land Working Group) (opposing amendments to the Indian
Land Consolidation Act because they do not provide options for individuals to consolidate
land); Clallam Judgment Funds: Hearing on S. 1340 Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs,
97th Cong. 9 (1981) (testimony of Ted George, Rep. of Port Gamble Indian Community,
Lower Elwha Tribal Community, and the Jamestown Band of Clallam Indians) (opposing a
bill drafted by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to distribute judgment funds awarded to them
by the Indian Claims Commission).
73. I chose not to select any cases of tribe-specific bills because most tribe-specific
bills do not generate the same kind of advocacy as general and pantribal bills, which tend
to affect Indian tribes across the country.
74. See infra Section II.C.2.
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any information about how, when, and why tribes lobbied prior
to 1975.
To develop the case studies, I examined primary data collected
from congressional hearings and committee reports on Indianrelated bills, oversight hearings held by Congress on specific
issues, and primary materials documenting tribal advocacy efforts
when they were available. I supplemented this information with
secondary sources describing tribal advocacy efforts. My intent is
to provide a thick description of the advocacy strategies used by
Indian nations in each of the three cases. I closely read congressional testimony and reports to track the development, enactment,
and implementation of specific policies. I used the hearings and
primary advocacy documents to trace the positions taken, arguments made, and strategies used by Indian nations in the policymaking process and to observe the interactions among Indian
tribes, legislators, and bureaucrats over time.75 The major limitation of relying on committee hearings is that they may reflect
more the preferences of the committee than the advocacy of the
witness.76 To address this concern, I reviewed both solicited and
unsolicited testimony by Indian nations and organizations at
committee hearings and used additional sources to confirm
my findings.

75. Congressional hearings allow for identification of the positions taken, arguments
made, and concerns raised by Indian nations and organizations on particular issues or bills.
BURSTEIN, supra note 60, at 134–40. This information provides insights into what Indian
nations advocated for or against and the proposals they made on a specific issue at a
particular time.
76. Some scholars have suggested that committee hearings reflect more the
preferences of the committee chair and members than the advocacy of the witness. While
committee members select the witnesses testifying orally, my data includes unsolicited,
written testimony as well. Moreover, committee hearings present an opportunity for targeted advocacy on a specific legislative proposal. As a result, “individuals and organizations
invited to testify at congressional hearings may legitimately feel that their testimony will
have an impact.” Id. at 104. By linking advocacy to a particular legislative proposal, the
hearing data allow for evaluation of the impact of that advocacy on the legislative outcome
(enactment or non-enactment) of the legislative proposal.
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2. Case studies of tribal lobbying
The following sections use case studies to explore each of the
three ways in which tribes have employed lobbying to protect
tribal sovereignty.
a. Initiating policy change. Tribes have long used legislative
advocacy to initiate new policies, to change existing ones, and to
expand policies into new areas. Some of the earliest tribal
legislative initiatives sought legislation allowing federal courts to
hear tribal claims against the United States government.77 Indian
tribes have initiated other kinds of tribe-specific legislation,78
including, inter alia, bills seeking federal recognition, restoration
or affirmation,79 taking land into trust,80 and settling land and
water rights claims.81 Indian nations have sought to change

77. Indian tribes had to solicit special federal legislation to bring claims against the
United States government. LAZARUS, supra note 40, at 124. For a more general discussion of
Indian claims, see DAVID E. WILKINS, HOLLOW JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF INDIGENOUS CLAIMS
IN THE UNITED STATES (2013).
78. Congress and Indians, supra note 14, at 103, 123–26 (defining tribe-specific bills and
presenting data on the prevalence of tribe-specific bills introduced in Congress from 1975
to 2012).
79. Making Strategic Choices, supra note 36, at 945–58 (discussing the various
legislative strategies used by non-federally recognized Indian groups from 1975 to 2012);
see also CASTILE, supra note 50, at 148–52 (describing the Menominee campaign to reverse
their termination); Haynal, supra note 38, at 294–96 (recounting the efforts of the Klamath
tribes of Oregon to regain federal recognition congressionally from 1987 to 1990); Mark
Moberg & Tawnya Sesi Moberg, The United Houma Nation in the U.S. Congress: Corporations,
Communities, and the Politics of Federal Acknowledgment, 34 URB. ANTHROPOLOGY 85, 110–16
(2005) (describing the experiences of the United Houma Nation in seeking federal
recognition from Congress).
80. See, e.g., Status of Certain Land Held in Trust for the Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians: Hearing on S. 1967 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 5–6 (2000)
(testimony of Chief Philip Martin, Mississippi Band of Choctaw) (arguing to have land
taken into trust for the tribe); H.R. 4364—S. 2418—H.R. 4365: Hearings on H.R. 4364 and S.
2418 and H.R. 4365 Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 97th Cong. 13–14 (1982)
(testimony of David G. Ramirez, Representative of the Pascua Yaqui) (arguing to have land
taken into trust for the tribe); Restoration of Land to the Colorado River Indian Reservation:
Hearing on S. 1652 Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 97th Cong. 15–17 (1982)
(testimony of Anthony Drennan, Sr., Colorado River Indian Tribes) (seeking restoration of
land to the Colorado River Indian Tribes); WILKINSON, supra note 47, at 210–18 (recounting
the almost seventy-year struggle of the Pueblo of Taos to regain sacred lands around
Blue Lake).
81. See, e.g., Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy’s Reservation Indian Reserved Water
Rights Settlement Act: Hearing on S. 438 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 40–
42 (1999) (testimony of Jim Morsette, Chippewa Cree Tribe of Rocky Boy’s Indian
Reservation) (supporting water rights compact negotiated by the tribe and the U.S.
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pantribal and general legislation as well. They have advocated to
establish new federal policies beneficial to their interests,82 to
remove discrepancies in existing federal policies,83 to expand
existing policies that work well for them,84 and to refine how they
are treated in general legislation.85
The Indian Tribal Government Tax Status Act of 1982 serves as
one example of tribes initiating policy change to protect their
tribal sovereignty. Indian tribes formulated the Indian Tribal
Government Tax Status Act of 1982 to clarify the application of the

government); Chitimacha and Mashantucket Pequot Indian Land Claims: Hearing on S. 2294 and
S. 2710 Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 97th Cong. 65–66 (1982) (testimony of Dan
Darden, Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana) (seeking legislation to resolve the tribe’s land
claims); Conferring of Jurisdiction on the U.S. Court of Claims with Respect to Certain Claims of
the Navajo Tribe: Hearing on S. 1196 Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong. 35–
40 (1981) (testimony of Guy Gorman, Navajo Nation) (seeking jurisdiction so the Indian
Court of Claims could hear specific claims of the Navajo Nation); Miller, supra note 38, at
434–38 (describing the successful efforts of the Timbisha Shoshone to obtain legislation
providing them with homeland from 1994 to 2000). For more detailed information on tribes
seeking to resolve water rights claims, see DANIEL MCCOOL, NATIVE WATERS:
CONTEMPORARY INDIAN WATER SETTLEMENTS AND THE SECOND TREATY ERA (2002);
Benjamin A. Kahn, Sword or Submission? American Indian Natural Resource Claims Settlement
Legislation, 37 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 109 (2012).
82. See, e.g., Elevate the Position of Director of the Indian Health Service to Assistant
Secretary for Indian Health Alaska Native and American Indian Direct Reimbursement Act:
Hearing on S. 299 and S. 406 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 24–25 (1999)
(testimony of Ron Allen, National Congress of American Indians) (arguing for the creation
of an Assistant Secretary for Indian Health within the Department of Health and Human
Services); Indian Self-Determination and Education Program: Hearings on S. 1017 Before the
Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the S. Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 93d Cong. (1973);
Indian Self-Determination: Hearing on S. 3157 and S. 1573 and S. 1574 and S. 2238 Before the
Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the S. Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 92d Cong. (1972);
Dumont, supra note 38, at 10 (discussing the efforts of Indian nations, pantribal
organizations, and Native Hawaiians to secure passage of the Native American Graves and
Repatriation Act).
83. See, e.g., 1981–82 Miscellaneous Tax Bills, XVI: Hearing on S. 1298 and S. 2197 and S.
2498 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation & Debt Mgmt. of the S. Comm. on Fin., 97th Cong. 86
(1982) (statement of Barry E. Snyder, President, Seneca Nation of Indians) (explaining that
the Association on American Indian Affairs instigated the drafting of the Indian Tribal
Governmental Tax Status Act).
84. See, e.g., Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-330, 110 Stat. 4016 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.) (expanding the self-determination model of
having tribes assume the administration and control over federal programs to lowincome housing).
85. For example, Indian tribes have advocated for treatment like a state in environmental statutes. James M. Grijalva, The Origins of EPA’s Indian Program, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 191, 218 (2006).
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Internal Revenue Code (IRC) to tribal governments. In the 1960s
and 1970s, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) handed down a
series of rulings on transactions involving Indian tribes.86 These
rulings left tribes in an anomalous position compared to other
governmental entities in the United States.87 While at least one
ruling stated that tribes were not taxable entities, the IRS found in
other rulings that tribes were not eligible for the favorable tax
treatments extended to the federal government and states and
their subdivisions.88 In short, the IRS had failed to develop a
coherent policy toward Indian tribes over time. This failure
undermined tribal sovereignty by treating tribes differently from
other governments in the United States. It further disadvantaged
tribes as governments because they did not benefit from the
favorable tax treatment that state and local governments in the
United States received under federal tax laws and thus did not
have the same opportunities to foster economic development on
tribal lands.
Indian tribes, led by the Association of American Indian
Affairs, initiated legislation to amend the tax code to treat tribes
like other governments.89 In 1975, they persuaded Congressman
Al Ullman (D-OR) to introduce the Indian Tribal Governmental
Tax Status Act90 in the House, and Senator Bob Packwood (R-OR)
to introduce a companion bill in the Senate.91 These bills sought to
amend the tax code to treat Indian tribal governments like federal,
state, and local governments and allowed tribes to issue a wide

86. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Small Steps on the Long Road to Self-Sufficiency for Indian
Nations: The Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act of 1982, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 335,
359 (1985).
87. For a discussion of these rulings, see id. at 360–61. The IRS refused to consider a
decedent’s gift to the Zuni Nation a charitable deduction in 1974. Id. at 360. It also
concluded that the sale of an automobile to an Indian tribe for governmental purposes to be
subject to federal excise taxes. Id. at 310–61. According to Williams, the IRS aggressively
sought to collect excise taxes from tribes. Id. at 361.
88. Id. at 359–62 (describing the tax status of tribes prior to the enactment of the
Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act).
89. 1981–82 Miscellaneous Tax Bills, XVI, supra note 83. (statement of Barry E. Snyder,
President, Seneca Indian Nation) (explaining that the Association on American Indian
Affairs instigated the drafting of the original bill). The Association of American Indian
Affairs was an organization of 50,000 Indian and non-Indian taxpayers. Id.
90. Indian Tribal Government Tax Status Act, H.R. 8989, 94th Cong. (1975).
91. Indian Tribal Government Tax Status Act, S. 2664, 94th Cong. (1975).
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variety of tax-exempt bonds.92 The influential House Committee
on Ways and Means held a hearing on the bill. At a hearing, the
Department of the Treasury stated that it would not oppose the
bill if it only applied to Indian tribes exercising substantial
government functions.93 Some tribes expressed concerns about
this language,94 but tribes universally supported the bill.95 Tribal
representatives advocated for the bill, arguing that it would
ensure that the IRS, like other federal agencies, treated Indian
tribes like sovereign governments and would enable tribes to
respond more effectively to the needs of their communities.96 The
House Committee on Ways and Means amended the bill to limit
the issuance of tribal bonds and recommended the bill’s passage,97
but the House did not have time to act on the bill before the end of
the session.98
Indian tribes and their allies did not give up their quest for tax
parity. Senator Packwood and Congressman Ullman reintroduced
92. Id.; H.R. 8989.
93. Miscellaneous Minor Tax Bills: Hearing on H.R. 8989 Before the H. Comm. on Ways &

Means, 94th Cong. 21 (1976) (Department of Treasury report).
94. See, e.g., id. at 33–35 (statement of Emil Farve, Chickasaw Nation).
95. Witnesses testified in support of the bill on behalf of the Oglala Sioux Tribe of
South Dakota, the Rosebud Sioux Tribe of South Dakota, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe of
South Dakota, the Nez Perce Tribe of Idaho, the Metlakatla Indian Community of Alaska,
the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community, the Hulapai Tribe of Arizona, the Pueblo
of Laguna of New Mexico, the Seneca Nation of New York, the Association of American
Indian Affairs, Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon, and the
Chickasaw Nation of Oklahoma. Statements were submitted by the Confederated Salish
and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation of Montana, the Three Affiliated Tribes of
the Fort Berthold Reservation of North Dakota, the Hoopa Tribe of the Hoopa Valley
Reservation of California, the Cheyenne Arapahoe Tribe of the Wind River Reservation of
Wyoming, the National Congress of American Indians, the Makah Tribe, the Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Reservation, the Puyallup Tribe of Indians, the Quileute Tribe, and
the Quinault Indian Tribe. Id. at 24–43. No tribes or American Indians appeared on the
record to oppose the bill. See id. One advocate representing several tribes explained, “In our
opinion, enactment of H.R. 8989 would be one of the single most positive steps taken by
Congress to better the condition of American Indian tribes in the United States since the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.” Id. at 35–36 (statement of Richard Anthony Baenen on
behalf of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation of
Montana, the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation of North Dakota, the
Hoopa Tribe of the Hoopa Valley Reservation of California, and the Cheyenne Arapohoe
Tribe of the Wind River Reservation of Wyoming).
96. Id. at 24–26 (statement of Richard Schifter).
97. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1693 (1976).
98. Miscellaneous Tax Bills: Hearings on H.R. 4089 Before the Subcomm. on Misc. Revenue
Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 95th Cong. 106 (1977).
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the Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act in 1977.99 The
House Committee on Ways and Means held another hearing on
the bill. Once again, tribes suggested minor amendments but
overwhelmingly supported its passage.100 They argued that the
bill was essential to the realization of tribal self-determination,101
consistent with recent federal legislation recognizing tribes as
separate sovereigns,102 and necessary to ensure equal treatment
for state and tribal governments in the United States.103 At the
same time, they pointed out that the bill would not lead to a
significant revenue loss to the United States.104 The Department of
the Treasury opposed the bill.105 The House Committee on Ways
99. H.R. 4089, 95th Cong. (1977); S. 2130, 95th Cong. (1977).
100. Witnesses submitted testimony in support of the bill on behalf the Oglala Sioux

Tribe of South Dakota, the Rosebud Sioux Tribe of South Dakota, the Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribe of South Dakota, the Nez Perce Tribe of Idaho, the Metlakatla Indian Community of
Alaska, the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community, the Hualapai Tribe of Arizona,
the Pueblo of Laguna of New Mexico, the Seneca Nation of New York, the Association of
American Indian Affairs, Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon,
Miccosukee Tribe of Florida, the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, the
Makah Tribe, the Quileute Tribe, the Nooksack Tribe, Lummi Tribe, Suquamish Tribe, and
the Northern Cheyenne Tribe of Montana. Some of these tribes also submitted statements.
Statements were also submitted by the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the
Flathead Reservation of Montana, the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Reservation of North Dakota, the Hoopa Tribe of the Hoopa Valley Reservation of
California, the Cheyenne Arapahoe Tribe of the Wind River Reservation of Wyoming, the
National Congress of the American Indian, the Puyallup Tribe of Indians, the Quinault
Indian Tribe, and the Navajo Nation. Miscellaneous Tax Bills, supra note 98, at 107–26. The
Papago Tribal Council indicated its support of the bill in a tribal council resolution sent to
and submitted into the record by Congressman Morris Udall. Id. at 123–24. As in previous
committee hearings on earlier versions of the bill, no tribes or American Indians appeared
on the record to oppose the bill.
101. Id. at 107 (statement of William E. Sudow) (“This bill is critically important to our
tribal clients, for it will provide the basis for further realization of true selfdetermination for Indian tribes.”); see also id. at 116 (statement of Ernest Clark, Colville
Confederated Tribes).
102. Id. at 107–08 (statement of William E. Sudow); id. at 121 (statement of the
National Congress of American Indians).
103. Id. at 110–11 (statement of William E. Sudow); id. at 123 (statement of the Navajo
Nation) (“It has been ironic and inequitable that the Indian Governments of this Nation,
which are the poorest governments, have been required to pay taxes not imposed on more
wealthy governments within the United States.”).
104. Id. at 112. Tribes suggested minor amendments to the bill, id., and supported
other amendments, id. at 113.
105. Id. at 111 (stating that the Department of the Treasury opposed the inclusion of
“recognized” in the definition of Indian tribe). Senator Packwood recalled a different
version of the Department of the Treasury’s opposition to this bill in 1982. 1981–82
Miscellaneous Tax Bills, XVI, supra note 83, at 64. He attributed the death of the bill to
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and Means amended the definition of an Indian tribe and
favorably reported out the bill in the Ninety-Fifth Congress, but
the House never voted on it.106 The bill was reintroduced in the
House again during the Ninety-Sixth Congress, but no action
was taken.107
Despite the failures of bills introduced in earlier congressional
sessions, tribes did not stop lobbying for an amendment to the tax
code. Their efforts gained momentum in the Ninety-Seventh
Congress.108 Senator Malcolm Wallop (R-WY) introduced S. 1298
and a companion bill was introduced in the House.109 In a Senate
Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management hearing on
S. 1298, the Department of the Treasury, which had a reputation
for not testifying in favor of any legislation at the time,110
supported the bill for equity reasons, explaining that if tribes act
like governments, they should be treated like governments.111 The
Department of the Treasury also endorsed the bill because it
would not cost the United States anything.112 The Department of
the Interior testified in favor of the bill for similar reasons.113
Tribes, tribal consortiums, and Indian organizations continued to
enthusiastically support the bill.114 Tribal leaders testified as to

Treasury’s opposition and suggested that it may have related to their longstanding, general
opposition to industrial development bonds. Id.
106. H.R. REP. NO. 95-843 (1978); Williams, supra note 86, at 365 (noting that the
House adjourned before voting on the bill).
107. Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act of 1979, H.R. 5918, 96th Cong. (1979).
108. Williams, supra note 86, at 365.
109. H.R. 3760, 97th Cong. (1981).
110. 1981–82 Miscellaneous Tax Bills, XVI, supra note 83, at 46–47 (recording Senator
Packwood interrupting, “I would like to interject that the last is very unusual. The Treasury
Department normally has the position at these hearings of being in opposition to almost all
of the bills that are here.”); see also id. at 69 (recording Senator Packwood noting “how
unusual it is to have the Treasury Department testifying in favor of a bill”).
111. Id. at 46–47, 50 (statement of William S. McKee, Tax Legislative Counsel, U.S.
Department of the Treasury). Aside from these statements, the Department of the Treasury
does not explain why it changed its position on the bill.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 58–59 (statement of Roy H. Sampsel, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Indian
Affairs, U.S. Department of the Interior).
114. Witnesses submitted testimony in support of the bill on behalf of the
Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon, the Ak-Chin Indian
Community, the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, the Kickapoo Tribe of
Kansas, the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, the Navajo Nation, the Northern Arapaho Indian
Nation, the Seneca Nation of Indians, the Shoshone Tribe of the Wind River Reservation,
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how the IRC undermined economic development and tribal
governments’ abilities to improve conditions for their people.115
They supported the bill for many of the same reasons that they
had in the past: it would ensure the equitable treatment of all
governments in the United States, strengthen tribal economic selfsufficiency, and recognize the appropriate role of tribal
governments.116 They also testified to the enormous support for
the bill throughout Indian country.117
Tribal support for the bill encouraged the Senate Committee
on Finance to ensure its enactment. The Senate Committee on
Finance did not report out the bill but recommended its passage
as a separate title to the Periodic Payment Settlement Act of
1982.118 The House had already passed the Periodic Payment
Settlement Act of 1982 (without the Indian Tribal Government Tax
Status Title) so a conference committee met to resolve the differences.119 The version of the bill that emerged from the conference
committee retained the Indian Tribal Tax Status Title but

the Tohono O’Odham Nation, the Tulalip Tribes of Washington, the Ute Mountain Tribe,
the Council of American Indians, the National Congress of the American Indian, the
Council of Energy Resource Tribes, the National Tribal Chairman’s Association, the Native
American Rights Fund, and the Association of American Indian Affairs. Id. at 70–91. As in
previous committee hearings on earlier versions of the bill, no tribes or American Indians
appeared on the record to oppose the bill.
115. Id. at 73 (statement of Delbert Frank, Sr., Confederated Tribes of the Warm
Springs Reservation of Oregon); see also id. at 77 (statement of Judy Knight, Council of
American Indians) (“[O]ne of the major obstacles confronting tribal governments . . . is
their inability to generate sufficient revenues . . . [in] that they do not have a number of
Federal tax advantages enjoyed by other governments in the United States . . . .”).
116. Id; see also id. at 86 (statement of Barry E. Snyder, President, Seneca Nation of
Indians of New York).
117. Id. at 86 (statement of Barry E. Snyder, President, Seneca Nation of Indians of
New York) (“As I believe the other speakers on this panel have made more than clear, S.
1298, the Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act, enjoys enormous support among
Indian tribes all across the Nation—Eastern tribes as well as Western tribes.”); see also id. at
84 (statement of Alfred Ward, Cochairman of the Business Council of the Shoshone Indian
Tribe of the Wind River Reservation) (noting that Indians have worked toward the
enactment of this bill for years). Tribal leaders engaged in efforts to mobilize Indian
country to support the legislation. For example, the National Tribal Chairman’s Association
urged tribes to contact their representatives about S. 1298 and included information on
submitting written testimony to the Senate Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt
Management in its July News Update. Nat’l Tribal Chairman’s Ass’n, News Briefs 7 (July
15, 1982).
118. S. REP. NO. 97-646 (1982).
119. Williams, supra note 86, at 368.
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amended it by limiting the ability of tribal governments to engage
in tax-exempt financing and to issue private activity bonds.120
After almost a decade of lobbying, tribes had made tremendous inroads toward tax parity with the enactment of the Indian
Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act.121 Admittedly, tribes may not
have achieved everything they wanted in the Act,122 but the bill
promoted tribal sovereignty by substantially changing the way
the IRS treated tribes.123 It extended the ways in which the IRS
treated tribes like states and was an important first step toward
tax parity.124
The Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act is one example
of how tribes have initiated legislation as a way to address a
problem that they face or that pervades Indian country more
generally. It illustrates how sustained legislative advocacy by
tribes transformed a law reform proposal into changes to the
federal tax code. Indians initiated the bill because they had
identified a threat to tribal sovereignty, namely the inequitable
treatment tribes experienced under the IRC, and found a solution
to it in proposing amendments to the IRC that would treat tribes
120. Id. The amendments restricting the issuance of tribal bonds responded to concerns raised by Representative Sam Gibbons (D-FL) about Indian gaming. KATHLEEN M.
NILLES, 2D ANN. NATIVE AM. FIN. CONF., TRIBAL BONDAGE: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TAXEXEMPT FINANCE RULES APPLICABLE TO TRIBES 1, 4 (2005), https://www.drinkerbiddle.com
/-/media/files/insights/publications/2005/01/tribal-bondage-a-brief-history-of-the-tax
exempt-__/tribal-bondage-a-brief-history-of-the-tax-exempt-finance-rules-applicable-to
-tribes.pdf. As enacted, the Indian Tribal Government Tax Status Act excluded from
taxation the interest on tax-exempt bonds used for essential governmental functions and
exempted tribes from paying certain federal excise taxes when they are engaged in
essential governmental functions. Indian Tribal Government Tax Status Act § 202(a), I.R.C.
§ 7871(a)(2), (b), (c)(1) (2012). It also allowed for the deductibility of charitable contributions
to governments for exclusively public purposes, of gifts and bequests for public purposes,
and of taxes paid to federal governments. § 202(a), I.R.C. § 7871(a)(1), (a)(3).
121. Act of Jan. 14, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-473, 96 Stat. 2605.
122. See, e.g., NAT’L CONG. AM. INDIANS, CURRENT TAX NEEDS IN INDIAN COUNTRY 3–
5, http://www.ncai.org/initiatives/partnerships-initiatives/ncai-tax-initiative/NCAI_Tax
_Reform_Briefing_Paper.doc (explaining that the Act “did not live up to its original
promise of treating tribes on par with states for federal tax purposes” and that NCAI
continues to advocate for tribal governments to be treated like states for all tax purposes).
Unlike states, tribal exemptions for bonds and federal excise taxes are restricted to essential
governmental functions. Tribes wanted bonds to enhance their economic development so
these limitations may have done little to improve their already limited financing options.
Williams, supra note 86, at 368–69.
123. Williams, supra note 86, at 340.
124. Id.
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like other governments. Tribes then worked to get their solution
enacted. Over time, they built relationships with members of
Congress. Indian nations navigated and developed relationships
with members of the House Committee on Ways and Means and
the Senate Committee on Finance in advocating for tax parity.
Their success suggests that Indian nations can exercise influence
outside of the House Committee on Natural Resources and the
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, the two congressional
committees with jurisdiction over Indian affairs.
The strategy used by advocates evolved as they increasingly
mobilized other Indians and Indian nations to advance legislation
to ensure tax parity.125 By the early 1980s, Indian nations had
solidified support across Indian country to present a unified front
to Congress.126 Moreover, Indian nations crafted sophisticated
testimony at the hearings, which detailed the impacts of the
existing inequalities on tribal economic development and highlighted the inconsistency between the IRC and the Tribal SelfDetermination Policy. They refined and expanded their arguments over time, responding to the election of a fiscally
conservative President by adding arguments about the costneutral impact of the change to the tax code. Indian nations
employed these arguments emphasizing tribal sovereignty and its
importance for tribal economic development to persuade
members of Congress to amend the tax code to treat Indian
nations more like other governments in the United States.
b. Reversing judicial decisions. Another strategy increasingly
employed by tribes and tribal organizations has been to persuade
Congress to overturn unfavorable decisions made by the Supreme
Court.127 Tribes frequently turned to this strategy after the
Supreme Court handed down a number of decisions that undermined tribal sovereignty in the late 1980s and early 1990s. But the
strategy of leveraging Congress against the courts has a longer
historical tradition. For example, after the Court of Claims had
dismissed their claims that the United States had illegally taken
125. Nat’l Tribal Chairman’s Ass’n, supra note 117.
126. 1981–82 Miscellaneous Tax Bills, XVI, supra note 83, at 86 (statement of Barry E.

Snyder, President, Seneca Nation of Indians of New York).
127. Berger, supra note 38, at 12; Newton, supra note 69, at 110.

1185

001.CARLSON_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/6/19 2:14 PM

2018

the Black Hills from them and the Supreme Court had declined to
review the decision, the Sioux Nation persuaded Congress to
enact legislation in 1978 to instruct the Court of Claims to review
the merits of the claim without regard to the defense of
res judicata.128
Recently, advocates have proposed legislation to overturn
specific court decisions. While the majority of these efforts have
targeted Supreme Court decisions, including Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe,129 Duro v. Reina,130 Seminole Tribe of Florida
v. Florida,131 Nevada v. Hicks,132 and Carcieri v. Salazar,133 a few have
sought to reverse or clarify appellate court decisions that undercut
tribal sovereignty.134 Some tribes have adopted a similar strategy
to address decisions unfavorable to them. For example, the MatchE-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians turned to Congress after the Supreme Court allowed a non-Indian individual to
challenge the Secretary of the Interior’s acquisition of 147 acres in
trust for the tribe.135 Congress enacted the Gun Lake Trust Land
Reaffirmation Act, which affirmed the trust acquisition and removed the matter from federal court jurisdiction.136

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

LAZARUS, supra note 40, at 344.
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 353 (2001) (holding that tribe could not hear civil
rights claims against state police arising out of search on-reservation for evidence of offreservation crimes).
133. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009); see, e.g., Rob Capriccioso, Senate Carcieri
Report Blames Supreme Court for Mess in Indian Country, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA
NETWORK (May 24, 2012); Gale Courey Toensing, Tester Re-introduces ‘Clean Carcieri Fix,’
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Mar. 19, 2015), http://indiancountrytoday
medianetwork.com/2014/04/01/tester-introduces-clean-carcieri-fix-154275; Rob Capriccioso,
Tribal Lease Bill Clears Senate After Carcieri Wrangling, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA
NETWORK (July 18, 2012); Gale Courey Toensing, Carcieri: Indian Country’s ‘Number One
Priority,’ INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Dec. 1, 2011).
134. Soaring Eagle Casino & Resort v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir.
2015); Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Gov’t, 788
F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2015); Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act of 2017, H.R. 986, 115th Cong. (2017);
Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act of 2017, S. 63, 115th Cong. (2017).
135. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S.
209 (2012).
136. Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, Pub. L. No. 113-179, 128 Stat. 1913
(2014). The Supreme Court upheld the statute in Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897 (2018).
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Tribal advocates’ success in persuading Congress to reverse
two Supreme Court decisions—Duro and Oliphant—demonstrates
how they have used lobbying to correct detrimental federal Indian
law policies made by the Supreme Court. Scholars have documented the efforts made by tribal advocates to enact legislation
overturning Duro v. Reina,137 thus this section focuses on the tribal
advocacy leading to the partial Oliphant reversal in the Violence
Against Women Act of 2013.
Tribal advocates have engaged in a long-term campaign to
overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish,
which undercut tribal sovereignty by stripping tribal governments
of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.138 As a result of the
Oliphant decision, Indian tribes, unlike most local communities in
the United States, do not have the authority to investigate and
prosecute all misdemeanor and felony crimes committed within
their territories.139 The Oliphant decision has had tremendous
practical consequences because it forces Indian tribes to rely on
state or federal law enforcement to arrest and prosecute nonIndians committing crimes in Indian country.140 In reality, the
federal and state governments rarely exercise this criminal
jurisdiction, allowing non-Indians to perpetrate crimes with
impunity and leaving Indian communities with little recourse.141
Tribal advocates, led by the National Congress of American
Indians Taskforce on Violence Against Women (NCAI Taskforce),
have pursued a partial Oliphant fix as part of the reauthorization
of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA).142 They argue that
protecting Native women from violence requires the restoration of

137. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 38, at 12; Newton, supra note 69, at 110; Lobbying
Against the Odds, supra note 25, at 443–46. In Duro v. Reina, the Supreme Court held that
Indian nations did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians. 495 U.S. 676,
679 (1990). The decision created a jurisdictional gap in Indian country because no
government (state, tribal, or federal) had the authority to prosecute non-member Indians
for crimes in Indian country.
138. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
139. Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Jurisdiction and Human Rights Accountability in Indian
Country, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 355, 357 (2013).
140. Id. at 357–58.
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., RESTORATION OF NATIVE SOVEREIGNTY AND SAFETY FOR NATIVE WOMEN,
Mar. 2013 (vol. 10, issue 1) [hereinafter RESTORATION 2013].
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criminal authority over all perpetrators of violence against Native
women to tribal governments. The NCAI Taskforce perceived the
periodic reauthorizations of the VAWA as an opportunity to
persuade members of Congress of the need to overturn the
Supreme Court’s decision in Oliphant and restore tribal criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians. Studies have reported incredibly
high incidences of non-Indian violence against Indian women.143
Federal laws restricting tribal criminal jurisdiction have left tribes
and Indian women with very little recourse against non-Indian
perpetrators.144 Tribal advocates were optimistic that these facts
might convince members of Congress to reverse Oliphant at some
point. But they were cautious and adopted an incremental
strategy to changing the law.145 They intended to educate the
public and members of Congress about the idea over several
years. Once members of Congress were comfortable with the idea,
tribal advocates would suggest including a partial Oliphant fix in a
VAWA reauthorization bill.
The NCAI Taskforce was in the process of implementing their
incremental approach before VAWA faced reauthorization in
2010.146 They had started educating members of Congress and the

143. AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS
WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA (2007), https://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs
/mazeofinjustice.pdf.
144. Id.; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Addressing the Epidemic of Domestic Violence in Indian
Country by Restoring Tribal Sovereignty, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (Mar. 23, 2009), https://www.
acslaw.org/issue_brief/briefs-2007-2011/addressing-the-epidemic-of-domestic-violence-in
-indian-country-by-restoring-tribal-sovereignty/.
145. Incremental approaches appear to be common among Indian advocates. EVANS,
supra note 32, at 54–55, 96.
146. American Indian women have a long history of organizing and advocating to
end violence against them. In the 1970s, Tilly Black Bear, a member of the Sicangu Lakota
Nation/Rosebud Sioux Tribe, joined the domestic violence movement. She became a
founding member of the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence (NCADV) and for
the next four decades continued to bring Native women’s issues to its attention. NAT’L
INDIGENOUS WOMEN’S RES. CTR., NATIVE HERSTORY: THE GROWTH OF THE MOVEMENT TO
END VIOLENCE AGAINST NATIVE WOMEN (2014), https://www.nrcdv.org/wp-content/up
loads/2018/03/NIWRCHistoryDVAM.pdf; The National Center for Victims of Crime
Remembers Tillie Black Bear, NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME (July 23, 2014), http://
victimsofcrime.org/media/news-releases/2014/07/23/the-national-center-for-victims-of
-crime-remembers-tillie-black-bear. The movement contributed to the enactment of key
domestic violence prevention legislation throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In 2003, NCAI
responded to Native women’s demands for tribal leaders to take violence against women
seriously by creating the NCAI Taskforce on Violence Against Women. NATIVE HERSTORY:
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public. Their efforts sought to influence Congress from both the
bottom up and the top down. For example, they allied with other
domestic violence groups to persuade Congress to include a
specific title to protect Native women in the 2005 VAWA
reauthorization,147 they collaborated with Amnesty International
to publish a report on the epidemic of sexual violence against
Indian women,148 and they convinced several international human
rights bodies to condemn the United States for its failure to
recognize tribal sovereignty and protect Native women from nonIndian perpetrators.149 They also started to circulate the idea that
tribes could and should exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonIndian perpetrators of violence against Native women in
Indian country.150
By 2010, Native women’s advocates had crafted draft
language to share with members of Congress and the Department
of Justice.151 Their draft provision adopted language similar to that
used in the previously enacted Duro fix, which had “recognized
and affirmed” the “inherent power of Indian tribes . . . to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.”152 The first section read,
Congress hereby affirms that the inherent sovereign authority
of a federally recognized Indian tribe includes the authority to
enforce and adjudicate any crime of domestic violence, dating

THE GROWTH OF THE MOVEMENT TO END VIOLENCE AGAINST NATIVE WOMEN, supra. The
movement increased its advocacy by collaborating with Amnesty International to produce
a report titled “Maze of Injustice: The Failure to Protect Indigenous Women from Sexual
Violence in the USA.” AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 143.
147. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005,
H.R. 3402, 109th Cong. (2005).
148. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 143
149. See, e.g., Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding
Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, United States of
America, ¶ 26, U.N. DOC. CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (May 8, 2008); VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE STATE’S OBLIGATION TO PROTECT (2011) (Civil Society
Briefing Paper on Community, Military and Custody, submitted to the United Nations
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Rashida Manjoo, in advance of her 2011
mission to the United States); see also RESTORATION OF NATIVE SOVEREIGNTY AND SAFETY
FOR NATIVE WOMEN, Feb. 2011 (vol. 8, issue 1) [hereinafter RESTORATION 2011], http://
www.niwrc.org/files/Restoration-V8.1.pdf.
150. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 143.
151. Draft Language for Violence Against Women Act § 2265B (Mar. 23, 2011)
(unpublished draft) (on file with author).
152. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012).
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violence, sexual assault, or stalking, as defined by tribal law,
committed by or against any Indian person on land under the
jurisdiction of the tribe.153

A second section ensured that anyone prosecuted by a tribal
court would have all the rights guaranteed under the Indian Civil
Rights Act and a right to expedited habeas corpus review in a
federal district court.154
Advocates relied heavily on the language used in the Duro fix
for several reasons. Like the drafters of the Duro fix, they expected
that if Congress ever enacted a partial Oliphant fix, non-Indians
would challenge it in the federal courts. Prominent Indian law
experts had crafted the Duro fix language to withstand constitutional scrutiny and prevent the Supreme Court from
interpreting the statute as delegating power to the tribes rather
than recognizing inherent tribal authority.155 The NCAI Taskforce
wanted a restoration of sovereignty, not a delegation, because a
restoration would make it harder for the Supreme Court to
overturn the fix. This strategy had worked previously—the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Duro fix in
United States v. Lara.156 Moreover, the Court’s decision in Lara
established a precedent, which could be relied on in challenges to
a partial Oliphant fix.
When they circulated the language to the Department of
Justice, the NCAI Taskforce received a favorable response, so they
moved up their timeline.157 With a Justice Department supportive
of the partial Oliphant fix, advocates stepped up their lobbying
efforts and, like in the case of the Duro fix, mobilized Indian

153. Draft Language for Violence Against Women Act § 2265B (Mar. 23, 2011)
(unpublished draft) (on file with author); see also RESTORATION 2011, supra note 149.
154. Id.; see also RESTORATION 2013, supra note 142.
155. Berger, supra note 38, at 13.
156. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
157. Letter from Ronald Weich, Assoc. Att’y Gen., to Joe Biden, Senate President (July
21, 2011), http://www.tribaljusticeandsafety.gov/docs/legislative-proposal-violence-against
-native-women.pdf. Native women had built relationships with key members of the Justice
Department while working in the Office of Violence Against Women during the Clinton
Administration. The receptivity of the Justice Department to their proposals most likely
reflected the strength of these relationships. As other scholars have suggested, the
nurturing of these relationships early on most likely helped to facilitate policy change later.
EVANS, supra note 32, at 74, 88–97.

1190

001.CARLSON_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1159

5/6/19 2:14 PM

Lobbying as a Strategy for Tribal Resilience

country to support the effort.158 In October 2011, Senator Daniel
Akaka (D-HI) introduced the Stand Against Violence and
Empower Native Women Act (SAVE Native Women Act), which
included a provision restoring tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian
perpetrators of violence against women in Indian Country.159
Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) incorporated the same provision
restoring tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians committing
intimate partner violence into a bill to reauthorize VAWA and
introduced it the next day.160 Less than six months later,
Representative Dan Boren (D-OK) introduced an identical bill in
the House.161 The Senate passed S. 1925 on April 26, 2012, but
despite broad bipartisan support for the provision restoring
limited tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, the House
Judiciary Committee failed to include it in the bill they reported
out to the full House.162

158. Tribal advocates used a similar strategy in advocating for the Indian Tribal
Government Tax Status Act. See supra Section II.C.2.
159. S. 1763, 112th Cong. (2012). The provision’s text changed over time, but each
version of the bill included language recognizing and affirming inherent tribal sovereignty.
Id. at § 201; see also RESTORATION OF NATIVE SOVEREIGNTY AND SAFETY FOR NATIVE WOMEN,
Mar. 2012 (vol. 9, issue 1), at 4, http://www.niwrc.org/files/Restoration-V9.1.pdf.
160. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2012, S. 1925, 112th Cong.
§ 904 (2011).
161. Stand Against Violence and Empower Native Women Act, H.R. 4154, 112th
Cong. (2012).
162. Ryan D. Dreveskracht, House Republicans Add Insult to Native Woman’s Injury, 3 U.
MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 1, 12 (2014) (“[D]uring the House Judiciary Committee
markup of the Bill, Committee Chairman Lamar Smith (R-TX) refused to allow
consideration of a substitute amendment offered by Ranking Member John Conyers, Jr. (DMI) that would reinsert the tribal provisions. Representative Darrell Issa (R-CA) attempted
to offer a similar amendment, which was also disregarded by the Judiciary Committee
Chairman.”); Jodi Gilette & Lynn Rosenthal, Addressing Violence Against Native Women in the
Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (May 14, 2012, 12:20 PM),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2012/05/14/addressing-violence-against-na
tive-women-violence-against-women-act-reauthorization. Some Republicans opposed the
Senate bill because it would restore limited criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians to tribal
governments that are not bound by the United States Constitution. Caroline P. Mayhew,
Opinion: Race, Tribal Authority and Violence Against Women Act, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY
MEDIA NETWORK (May 29, 2012), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/ict_sbc
/vawa-tribal-provisions-and-race-discrimination-arguments (“Following passage of the
Senate bill, Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona released a statement claiming that ‘by subjecting
individuals to the criminal jurisdiction of a government from which they are excluded on
account of race,’ the tribal jurisdiction provision ‘would quite plainly violate the
Constitution’s guarantees of Equal Protection and Due Process.’”). They insinuated that
tribal governments would infringe on the human rights of non-Indian criminal defendants.
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Tribal advocates increased their advocacy, calling on Congress
to enact legislation that protected all victims of violence. In June,
the NCAI Taskforce met with congressional leaders, sponsored a
rally on Capitol Hill to show solidarity against the House bill, and
partnered with the National Task Force to End Sexual and
Domestic Violence Against Women on a ten-day national campaign to raise awareness about the importance of enacting an
inclusive version of VAWA.163 Native women expanded their
efforts by reaching out to their existing allies including, but not
limited to, the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence,
Amnesty International, and the Indian Law Resource Center.164
These allies further contributed to the effort by spreading the
word to their contacts and circulating PSAs to educate members
of Congress and the general public about violence against Native
women.165 The NCAI Taskforce and its allies mobilized organizations throughout Indian country and the United States to
support their efforts and urge their members to take action.166
Fifty law professors answered their calls to advocate for Native
women by drafting a letter to several senators explaining the

See Letter from the Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers & the Nat’l Ass’n of Fed.
Defenders, to Sen. Harry Reid, Majority Leader; Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Comm. on
the Judiciary; Sen. Mitch McConnell, Minority Leader; and Sen. Charles Grassley, Ranking
Member, Comm. on the Judiciary (Apr. 23, 2012), http://nacdl.org/WorkArea/Download
Asset.aspx?id=24053 (on the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2012
(S. 1925)) (arguing that enactment of the bill to reauthorize VAWA would deprive nonIndian defendants of basic constitutional rights with no effective remedy).
163. Advocating and Protecting Native Women; NCAI Violence Against Women Task Force
Leads VAWA Meetings on Capitol Hill, NAT’L CONG. AM. INDIANS (July 5. 2012), http://
www.ncai.org/news/articles/2012/07/05/advocating-and-protecting-native-women-ncai
-violence-against-women-task-force-leads-vawa-meetings-on-capitol-hill.
164. Over time, Native women had built partnerships with these groups. See supra
note 146.
165. IndianLawResourceCenter, To the Indigenous Woman Long Format, Poem by 1491s,
YOUTUBE (Jan. 9, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P4Up0drnXX4; IndianLawResourceCenter, To the Indigenous Woman, Indian Law Resource Center, by the 1491s, YOU TUBE
(Oct. 21, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AUt6sxF2s2U (urging viewers to do
something like call their member of Congress).
166. See, e.g., VAWA Reauthorization, S. 1925, Passes Senate, INDIAN L. RESOURCE CTR.,
http://indianlaw.org/safewomen/vawa-reauthorization-s1925-passes-senate (last visited
Feb. 1, 2019) (urging readers to contact their members of Congress and tell them to
reauthorize VAWA); Laura Garbes, SAVE Native Women Act: Addressing Domestic Violence
on Reservations, CULTURAL SURVIVAL (July 12, 2012), https://www.culturalsurvival.org
/news/save-native-women-act-addressing-domestic-violence-reservations.

1192

001.CARLSON_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1159

5/6/19 2:14 PM

Lobbying as a Strategy for Tribal Resilience

importance of tribal sovereignty in protecting Native women from
violence and the legality of the partial Oliphant fix in the Senate
bill.167 Neither the House nor the Senate was willing to
compromise, and the 112th Congress ended without reauthorizing VAWA.
The NCAI Taskforce and their allies relentlessly continued
advocating for a bill that would restore tribal criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians committing intimate partner violence. Senator
Patrick Leahy reintroduced a VAWA reauthorization bill complete with the tribal jurisdiction provisions on January 22, 2013.168
The NCAI Taskforce immediately launched a grassroots campaign, sending out a toolkit for advocating to tribal nations,
coalition partners, and supporters.169 Their partners continued to
apply pressure as well.170 The Senate moved quickly to pass the
bill and rejected two amendments that would have weakened the
restoration of tribal criminal jurisdiction, but the House was not
expected to move on the legislation.171 At the end of the 112th
Congress, Representatives Tom Cole (R-OK) and Darrell Issa (RCA) had introduced a compromise bill that would grant nonIndian defendants the ability to remove the case from tribal court
to federal court if they believed their rights had been violated.172
The House did not act on the bill, but its sponsors were expected
to reintroduce it in the 113th Congress.173

167. Letter from Law Professors, to Senator Patrick Leahy, et al. (Apr. 21, 2012) (on the
Constitutionality of Tribal Government Provisions in the VAWA Reauthorization) (on file
with author).
168. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127
Stat. 54 (2013).
169. NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, SPEAK OUT & ACT NOW! ADVOCATING FOR THE
REAUTHORIZATION OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT: A TOOLKIT FOR TRIBAL NATIONS
(on file with author) (including a fact sheet, talking points on tribal criminal jurisdiction
provisions in S. 47, tips for meeting with policymakers, sample call script, sample letter to a
member of Congress, and social media ideas).
170. See, e.g., New Legislation to End Violence Against Native Women, AMNESTY INT’L,
https://www.amnestyusa.org/new-legislation-to-end-violence-against-native-women/
(last visited Feb. 1, 2019) (urging readers to tell their senators and representatives to vote
for the reauthorization of VAWA and the SAVE Native Women Act).
171. General Memorandum 13-017: Senate Passes VAWA Reauthorization with Tribal
Provisions Intact; Defeats Two Amendments Seeking to Strip Tribal Authority, HOBBS STRAUS
DEAN & WALKER (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.hobbsstraus.com/general-memorandum-13-017.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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The NCAI Taskforce and Indian nations knew the fight was
not over yet and persisted in their efforts. The House continued to
entertain a bill identical to the one it passed in the 112th Congress.
The bill excluded protections for gay, bisexual, and transgender
survivors of domestic abuse and recognition of tribal criminal
jurisdiction.174 Thus, it came under intense scrutiny from Indian
nations, Democrats, women’s groups, immigrant groups, the
LGBT community, and human rights groups, and failed to pass
the House.175
In the end, tribal advocates built a strong coalition to overcome the opposition to the restoration of limited tribal criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indian perpetrators of intimate partner
violence. With public pressure mounting, Speaker John Boehner
(R-OH) decided to bring the Senate bill to the floor without
having the support of most House Republicans. After lengthy
debate, the House passed the Senate version of the bill.176
President Obama signed the VAWA Reauthorization Act into law
on March 7, 2013.177 The Act included a section restoring the
inherent power of tribal governments to exercise special domestic
violence criminal jurisdiction over all persons committing specific
intimate partner-related crimes in Indian country.178
The VAWA Reauthorization of 2013 represents a recent trend
of Indian nations using lobbying to protect tribal sovereignty by
countering detrimental Supreme Court decisions.179 It demonstrates how astute Indian advocates have leveraged institutions
against one another in a sophisticated way to protect tribal
sovereignty and limit the ability of the federal government to

174. Ashley Parker, House Renews Violence Against Women Measure, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 28, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/01/us/politics/congress-passes-reautho
rization-of-violence-against-women-act.html (noting that “more than 1,300 women’s and
human rights groups signed a letter supporting the Senate legislation”).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127
Stat. 54 (2013).
178. Id. at § 904; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1304.
179. See, e.g., Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act of 2017, H.R. 986, 115th Cong. (2017)
(seeking to overturn two decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit holding
that the National Labor Relations Act applies to Indian tribes); Tribal Labor Sovereignty
Act of 2017, S. 63, 115th Cong. (2017) (same).
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undermine tribal rights in the future.180 Native women borrowed
elements of their strategy from the earlier success of tribal
advocates in their efforts to enact the legislation overturning Duro
v. Reina. In particular, they crafted legislative language that would
curb judicial authority to undercut legislative recognition of their
sovereignty.181 Native women also built on their previous
advocacy to protect Native women from sexual and domestic
violence in advancing a campaign to restore tribal criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indian perpetrators in cases of intimate
partner violence. They capitalized on the relationships they had
developed over time with government officials and other interest
groups and utilized the reauthorization of general legislation
condemning violence against women to partially reverse a court
decision detrimental to them. Their persistent employment of a
multi-front strategy—mobilizing both at the grass roots and
international levels to apply pressure to legislators—in the face of
strong opposition persuaded legislators to enact the reforms
they wanted.182
c. Overseeing policy implementation. Tribes have also used legislative advocacy to encourage congressional oversight of Indian
affairs.183 Congress has the responsibility to make and oversee the
administration of Indian affairs under the Constitution.184
Oversight is “the review, monitoring, and supervision of the
implementation of public policy.”185 Congress exercises oversight
180. American Indians have employed lobbying to leverage federal institutions
against each other in other contexts as well. See, e.g., Making Strategic Choices, supra note 36,
at 949–50.
181. Federal courts do not appear to have adjudicated the issue of the VAWA fix’s
constitutionality yet.
182. Tribes are in the process of implementing the reaffirmation of jurisdiction in
VAWA 2013. Eighteen tribes are currently exercising the special domestic violence criminal
jurisdiction to combat violence against women in their territories. NAT’L CONG. OF AM .
INDIANS, VAWA 2013’S SPECIAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: CRIMINAL JURISDICTION FIVE-YEAR
REPORT 6 (2018), http://www.ncai.org/resources/ncai-publications/SDVCJ_5_Year_Report
.pdf. Across these tribes, there have been 143 arrests, 73 guilty pleas, 6 trials, 5 acquittals,
and 1 jury trial conviction. Id. at 7.
183. Indian nations have long petitioned Congress and the Bureau of Indian Affairs to
improve implementation of federal Indian law policies. Carpenter, supra note 42, at 349.
184. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
185. ALISSA M. DOLAN, ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL 1 (2014); see also Matthew D. McCubbins &
Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28
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through a broad range of activities investigating and monitoring
agency actions, including informal contacts with agency officials,
hearings, and reporting requirements.186 Advocates often encourage oversight activities to educate Congress about implementation
issues and recommend substantive changes in legislation that will
curb agency discretion in implementing statutes.187
Tribal leaders have encouraged congressional committees to
exercise oversight by educating members of Congress about the
issues arising in Indian country generally, as well as drawing
attention to problems in the implementation of existing federal
Indian policies. Congress has held oversight hearings on a range
of issues affecting Indians including, but not limited to, gaming,188
land,189 crime and law enforcement,190 the trust responsibility,191
Indian child welfare,192 economic development,193 tribal lobbying,194

AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 165 (1984) (defining oversight as attempts by Congress “to detect and
remedy executive-branch violations of legislative goals”).
186. MORTON R OSENBERG, WHEN CONGRESS COMES CALLING: A STUDY ON THE
PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, AND PRAGMATICS OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY 5-6 (2017); Jack M.
Beerman, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 122 (2006).
187. Beerman, supra note 186, at 99.
188. See, e.g., Oversight Hearing on the Regulation of Indian Gaming: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. (2005).
189. See, e.g., Oversight Hearing on Taking Lands into Trust: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. (2005); Oversight Hearing on Tribal Proposals to Acquire Land-inTrust for Gaming Across State Lines and How Such Proposals are Affected by the Off-Reservation
Discussion Draft Bill: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Nat. Res., 109th Cong. (2005).
190. See, e.g., Law Enforcement in Indian Country: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007); The Problem of Methamphetamine in Indian Country: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006).
191. See, e.g., Proposed Reorganization of Major Agencies and Functions Related to Indian
Trust Reform Matters Within the Department of the Interior: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. (2004); Oversight Hearing on Possible Mechanisms to Settle the Cobell
Versus Norton Lawsuit: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. (2003).
192. See, e.g., Oversight Hearings on the Indian Child Welfare Act: Hearing Before the S.
Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 100th Cong. (1987); Oversight on the Implementation of the
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 98th
Cong. (1984).
193. See, e.g., Unemployment on Indian Reservations at 50 Percent: The Urgent Need to
Create Jobs in Indian Country: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 111th Cong.
(2010); Oversight of Economic Development on Indian Reservations: Hearing Before the S. Select
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 97th Cong. (1982).
194. See, e.g., Oversight Hearing Regarding Tribal Lobbying Matters, et al.: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. (2005); Oversight Hearing Regarding Tribal
Lobbying Matters, et al.: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. (2005).
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tribal natural resources,195 housing,196 and the BIA’s mission
and responsibilities.197
Despite the numerous hearings that Congress has held overseeing federal Indian policy over the past two centuries, very little
scholarship exists on congressional oversight of Indian affairs and
the role that tribes have played in encouraging it.198 Tribes have
used oversight hearings to advocate for Congress to implement
policies it enacted, to improve regulatory policies, and to
encourage Congress to address problems arising in Indian

195. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries & Wildlife Conservation & the
Env’t on Great Lakes Fishing Rights, 96th Cong. (1980); Federal Timber Sale Polices: Joint
Hearings Before a Special Subcomm. on the Legislative Oversight Function of the S. Comm. on
Interior & Insular Affairs and the Subcomm. on Pub. Works of the H. Gov’t Operations Comm.,
84th Cong. (1955).
196. See, e.g., Innovative Solutions to Addressing Housing Needs in Our Indian
Communities: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, House, & Urban Affairs and the S. Comm.
on Indian Affairs, 111th Cong. (2010); Oversight Hearing on Housing Issues in Indian Country:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007).
197. See, e.g., Bureau of Indian Affairs’ Capacity and Mission: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. (1999).
198. Scholars have yet to develop a robust literature on congressional oversight of
Indian affairs. They have yet to address questions of how, when, and why Congress
exercises oversight over Indian affairs, consider whether congressional oversight over
Indian affairs differs from its oversight of other policies, determine the role of Indian tribes
in oversight, or study how congressional oversight of Indian affairs has changed over time.
A few scholars have studied congressional oversight of specific Indian policies. See, e.g.,
Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Congress, Tribal Recognition, and Legislative-Administrative Multiplicity, 91 IND. L.J. 955 (2016) [hereinafter Congress, Tribal Recognition] (discussing
congressional oversight of federal recognition policy); E. Fletcher McClellan, Implementation
and Policy Reformulation of Title I of the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act
of 1975–80, 6 WICAZO SA REV. 45 (1990); Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven Andrew Light, How
Congress Can and Should “Fix” the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: Recommendations for Law and
Policy Reform, 13 VA . J. SOC. P OL’Y & L. 396, 396 (2006) (reviewing congressional oversight of
Indian gaming). Others have looked at the implementation of specific policies or programs.
See, e.g., Kevin K. Washburn, Agency Conflict and Culture: Federal Implementation of the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act by the National Indian Gaming Commission, the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
and the Department of Justice, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 303 (2010). The literature on Indian advocacy
has largely overlooked the role of Indians in encouraging oversight. A few existing
accounts of legislative histories implicitly acknowledge that tribes use lobbying to
encourage oversight by describing Indian lobbying efforts as precursors to specific Indianrelated statutes, see, e.g., Making Strategic Choices, supra note 36, at 950 (explaining how
Congress responded to concerns raised by non-federally recognized Indian groups in
enacting the Federally Recognized Tribe List Act of 1994); Royster, supra note 38, at 1075–76
(describing the Indian Mineral Development Act as a reaction to Indian complaints about
the mineral leasing process), but scholars have yet to consider fully the relationships
between Indian advocacy and congressional oversight.
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country.199 This section explores how tribes have used advocacy to
oversee and improve the implementation of the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA).
A radical transformation in federal Indian policy occurred in
1975 when Congress formally adopted a new policy in the
ISDEAA.200 The ISDEAA shifted Indian policy from terminating
Indian nations and assimilating Indians into mainstream
American society to promoting tribal sovereignty. It fosters the
building of tribal institutional capacities and economies by
transferring control over federal programs to the tribes.201 It
required the Secretaries of the Interior and Health and Human
Services, upon the request of any Indian tribe, to contract with
tribal organizations to operate federal programs for Indians.202
Scholars and tribal leaders have praised the ISDEAA as the most
successful federal Indian policy ever enacted by Congress,203 but
the federal government has struggled to implement it fully.204
Tribes have played a key role in the implementation of
the ISDEAA by repeatedly lobbying Congress to improve both
the ISDEAA and its implementation. They have sought to ensure
that the ISDEAA is implemented to fulfill its goals of promoting
tribal sovereignty through “the development of strong and stable
tribal governments, capable of administering quality programs
and developing the economies of their respective communities.”205
They have not achieved all their goals in seeking full
199. Congress, Tribal Recognition, supra note 198, at 997–98; Making Strategic Choices,
supra note 36, at 956–57.
200. 25 U.S.C. § 5302 (2012) (original version at § 450(a), 88 Stat. 220, 93-638 (1975)).
Several scholars trace the origin of the policy to an earlier statement made by President
Richard Nixon. See, e.g., GROSS, supra note 46, at 34. Others contend that initiation of the
policy began in the Johnson Administration. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Robbins, The Forgotten
American: A Foundation for Contemporary American Indian Self-Determination, 6 WICAZO SA
REV. 27 (1990).
201. GROSS, supra note 46, at 20–21.
202. See Washburn, supra note 11, at 781.
203. GROSS, supra note 46, at 20–21.
204. See, e.g., S. Bobo Dean & Joseph H. Webster, Contract Support Funding and the
Federal Policy of Indian Tribal Self-Determination, 36 TULSA L.J. 349, 352 (2000); Tadd M.
Johnson & James Hamilton, Self-Governance for Indian Tribes: From Paternalism to
Empowerment, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1251, 1263–67 (1995); McClellan, supra note 198, at 46–48;
Strommer & Osborne, supra note 10, at 20; Paul H. Stuart, Financing Self-Determination:
Federal Indian Expenditures, 1975-1988, 14 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 1, 5–6 (1990).
205. 25 U.S.C. § 5302 (2012) (original version at § 450(a), 88 Stat. 220, 93-638 (1975)).
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implementation of the ISDEAA, but their efforts have led to
significant amendments to the ISDEAA and improvements in its
implementation.206 This case study focuses on tribal advocacy
leading to the amendment of the ISDEAA in 1988 and how that
advocacy changed oversight and implementation of the ISDEAA.
Despite consultation in the creation of the ISDEAA and its
regulations,207 tribal advocates began identifying problems in the
implementation of the ISDEAA almost immediately after its
enactment.208 Concerns raised by tribes led to several early
oversight efforts by the federal government, including a 1977
oversight hearing held by the Senate Select Committee on Indian

206. Strommer & Osborne, supra note 10, at 48–49.
207. Scholars disagree about the extent to which Congress consulted tribes in

formulating the ISDEAA. Wilkinson admits that Indian people did not play a direct role in
formulating the Self-Determination Policy, WILKINSON, supra note 47, at 189, but notes that
the arrival of American Indians as staffers to the Senate Interior Committee and the House
Interior Committee in the early 1970s contributed to the change in policy and explosion of
Indian legislation. Id. at 195. Strommer and Osborne similarly report a lack of tribal input
on the ISDEAA. Strommer & Osborne, supra note 10, at 20. In contrast, Delaney suggests
that tribal advocates initially suggested that the Kennedy Administration use the
government contracting process as a mechanism for transferring control over federal funds
and programs from agencies to tribes. Danielle A. Delaney, The Master’s Tools: Tribal
Sovereignty and Tribal Self-Governance Contracting/Compacting, 5 AM . INDIAN L.J. 309, 328
(2017). It is unclear whether Delaney is referring to tribal lobbying for Office of Economic
Opportunity (OEO) funding to go directly to tribes (rather than the states) in 1964 or
something else. WILKINSON, supra note 47, at 127–28. The channeling of federal funds
directly to tribes through OEO programs empowered tribes and encouraged them to
consider policy proposals similar to the OEO programs that could replace the termination
policy. Lobbying Against the Odds, supra note 25, at 435. Tribes and tribal coalitions also
testified at committee hearings held prior to the enactment of the ISDEAA. Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1987: Hearing on S. 1703 Before the
S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 100th Cong. 37 (1987) (statement of Joseph DeLaCruz,
Quinault Nation) (explaining that he was “directly involved in the policy discussion
leading to the original Self-Determination Act”); Implementation of Public Law 93-638, The
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Interior
& Insular Affairs, 94th Cong. (1975); Indian Self-Determination and Education Program: Hearing
on S. 1017 and Related Bills Before the S. Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 93d Cong. (1973);
Indian Self-Determination: Hearing on S. 3157, S. 1573, S. 1574, and S. 2238 Before the S. Comm.
on Interior & Insular Affairs, 92d Cong. (1972).
208. Many tribes were not happy with the regulations as finally promulgated in
December 1975. They provided extensive comments to the Senate Select Committee on
Indian Affairs. Implementation of Public Law 93-638, supra note 207. Tribal leaders raised
inadequate funding as another problem in implementing ISDEAA. Id. at 244 (testimony of
Alan Parker).
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Affairs and a 1978 General Accountability Office Report.209
Senator Abourzek responded to tribal concerns by introducing
legislation to amend the ISDEAA in 1978 to allow tribes to
consolidate programs into a single grant for each fiscal year.210 The
Senate passed the bill, but it died in the House.211
Indian nations continued to raise concerns about the implementation of the ISDEAA.212 In 1982, the Senate Select Committee
on Indian Affairs responded by holding an oversight hearing on
indirect and other contract support costs, which include
administrative costs associated with operating federal programs
under the ISDEAA.213 The Committee amassed almost 500 pages
of testimony from tribes and tribal consortiums on the issues they
faced in contracting under the ISDEAA.214 Some tribes discussed
their experiences with budget shortfalls due to inadequate
funding of indirect costs associated with ISDEAA contracts.215
They explained how those budget shortfalls undermined their
209. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Implementation: Hearing
Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong. (1977); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, CONTROLS ARE NEEDED OVER INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION CONTRACTS, GRANTS,
AND TRAINING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO INSURE REQUIRED SERVICES ARE
PROVIDED TO INDIANS (1978).
210. Amend the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act: Hearing on S.
2460 Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong. (1978). Senator Abourek introduced another, similar bill earlier in the same congressional session. A Bill to Amend the
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, S. 2372, 98th Cong. (1977).
211. This bill may have died because it was referred to the House late in the
congressional session.
212. Oversight of Indirect Costs and Contract Provisions of the Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 97th Cong.
1–2 (1982) (statement of Chairman William S. Cohen).
213. Id. Chairman Cohen mentioned the problems faced by the Lac Courte Oreilles
Band of Chippewa, who had to request that Congress enact legislation to distribute some of
their judgment funds to cover indirect costs stemming from the contracting process.
214. Oversight of Indirect Costs and Contract Provisions of the Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act, supra note 212.
215. See, e.g., id. at 29–92 (testimony of Gordon Thayer, Lac Courte Oreilles Band of
Chippewa) (recounting the difficulties the tribe faced in addressing shortfalls in indirect
costs and how they nearly drove it into receivership); id. at 108–09 (testimony of Edward
Little, All Indian Pueblo Council) (discussing the inadequate funding to administer federal
programs and the resulting indirect cost shortfalls); id. at 120–22 (testimony of Tim Love,
Penobscot Nation) (discussing the Nation’s experience with budget shortfalls due to
inadequate funding for indirect costs); id. at 126–27 (statement of Allan White Lightning,
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe) (discussing the tribe’s experience with budget shortfalls due to
inadequate funding for indirect costs and recommending creation of a taskforce to address
these issues).
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ability to provide their tribal citizens with much-needed
programs.216 Others opposed the adoption of revisions to the
regulations for various reasons, including BIA assertions that the
Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act should govern
self-determination contracts.217
Indian leaders persuaded Congress to enact technical amendments to the ISDEAA in 1984.218 These amendments exempted
tribal contracts from the Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement
Act as recommended by Indian nations in the 1982 Oversight
hearing,219 but fell short of fixing all the implementation problems
identified by Indian nations, particularly those associated with the
inadequate funding of indirect costs.220 The responsiveness of
Congress to tribal concerns, however, encouraged tribal leaders to
continue to keep problems in the contracting process on the
congressional agenda and to advocate for their resolution.
In the mid-1980s, tribes employed lobbying to convince
Congress to increase its oversight of tribal contracting and to
amend the ISDEAA to ensure better implementation by the BIA
216. See, e.g., id. at 29–92 (testimony of Gordon Thayer, Lac Courte Oreilles Band of
Chippewa); id. at 108–09 (testimony of Edward Little, All Indian Pueblo Council); id. at
120–22 (testimony of Tim Love, Penobscot Nation); id. at 126–27 (statement of Allan White
Lightning, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe).
217. See, e.g., id. at 93–95 (testimony of Maxine Edmo, Fort Hall Business Council)
(opposing adoption of draft revisions to the regulations implementing the ISDEAA because
they would allow termination of contracting without tribal consent); id. at 108–09
(testimony of Edward Little, All Indian Pueblo Council) (opposing changes to the
regulations); id. at 114 (testimony of Ronald P. Andrade, National Congress of American
Indians) (opposing change from contracting to competitive grants and noting lack of
consultation with tribes in proposing this change); id. at 125 (testimony of Virginia
Thomas, Passamaquoddy Tribe) (opposing changes to the regulations implementing
ISDEAA contracting).
218. A Bill to Make Technical Amendments to the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act and Other Acts, Pub. L. No. 98-250, 98 Stat. 118 (1984). President
Reagan vetoed an earlier version of the same bill, S. 973, 98th Cong. (1983); see also Delaney,
supra note 207, at 330 (describing the 1984 ISDEAA Amendments as the product of
tribal advocacy).
219. See, e.g., Oversight of Indirect Costs and Contract Provisions of the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 97th Cong. 118 (1982) (statement of Ronald P. Andrade, National Congress of
American Indians) (noting that Indian tribes were not mentioned in the Federal Grant and
Cooperative Agreement Act and that the ISDEAA represented “clear congressional intent
of establishing a tribal right to contract for BIA and IHS programs and services”).
220. An Act to Make Technical Amendments to the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act and Other Acts, 98 Stat. 118 (1984).
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and IHS. After struggling with implementation issues for a
decade, tribes had had enough and started raising concerns to
members of Congress. Representative Morris Udall (D-AZ)
responded to Indian frustrations by introducing the Indian SelfDetermination Amendments of 1986, which sought to address
issues with contract support costs.221 Around the same time, a
group of ten tribes formed the Alliance of American Indian
Leaders to advocate for congressional recognition of the
government-to-government relationship between tribes and the
federal government.222 They targeted the House Appropriations
Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies.223
Aware of tribal concerns, Senator Daniel Inouye (D-HI),
chairman of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, held an
oversight hearing on the implementation of the ISDEAA in April
1987.224 He announced that the committee would be working on
proposing amendments to the bill and invited tribal participation
in the crafting of those amendments.225 Representing numerous
tribal clients, Reid Chambers summarized many of the concerns
raised by tribes in the 1987 hearing:
[T]ribes and tribal organizations have experienced tremendous
frustrations with the 638 process. They receive insufficient funds
to operate contracted programs. They are not permitted to
contract for some programs at all. They are burdened with
excessive paperwork and agency oversight. Minor contract
modifications, virtually every purchase of equipment, and most

221. H.R. 4147, 99th Cong. (1986). For a description of the bill, see Dean & Webster,
supra note 204, at 358.
222. Strommer & Osborne, supra note 10, at 31. Members of Congress acted in
response to lobbying by a group of ten tribes, called the Alliance of American Indian
Leaders, submitting a proposal to the United States House Interior and Related Agencies
Subcommittee on Appropriations. Id. This alliance included the Quinault Indian Nation,
the Lummi Tribe, the Jamestown S’kallam, the Rosebud Sioux, the Mille Lacs Band of
Ojibwe, the Red Lake Chippewa, the Hoopa Tribe, the Central Council of the Tlingit-Haida,
the Mescalero Apache, and the Crow Tribe. Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 204, at 1266–
68. It worked closely with Senator Evans to devise the Tribal Self-Governance
Demonstration Project incorporated into the ISDEAA Amendments of 1988. Id.
223. Strommer & Osborne, supra note 10, at 31.
224. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Public Law 93-638: Hearing
Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 100th Cong. (1987).
225. Recommendations for Strengthening the Indian Self-Determination Act: Hearing Before
the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 100th Cong. 1–2 (1987).
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leases and subcontracts require agency approval. Federal procurement regulations designed for an entirely different sort of
contract are indiscriminately applied to them. The process of
self-determination has become a complex and often adversarial
exercise in bureaucracy.226

Tribal leaders and advocates reiterated these concerns.227 A
few months after the hearing, the Arizona Republic published a
series of articles exposing corruption and misuse of funds by the
BIA.228 The articles seemed to confirm and validate many of the
problems tribes were raising about implementation of
the ISDEAA.229
After the hearing, the Senate Select Committee on Indian
Affairs collaborated with Indian nations to develop legislation to
amend the ISDEAA and sent draft versions of proposed bills to
Indian nations for review.230 Senator Daniel Evans (R-WA) and
Representative Morris Udall (D-AZ) introduced identical bills, S.
1703 and H.R. 1223, to amend the ISDEAA in fall 1987.231 As a

226. Id. at 140 (prepared statement of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, the Assiniboine
and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Reservation, the Seneca Nation, Yukon-Kuskokwim
Health Corporation, Kodiak Area Native Association, Aleutian/Pribilof Island Association,
Bristol Bay Native Association, and the Association of Regional Health Directors, Alaska).
227. Id. at 20 (testimony of Philip Martin, Chief, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians)
(detailing the problems that the tribe has faced over the past six years in contracting with
the BIA and IHS, especially in regard to the payment of contract support costs); id. at 26–28
(statement of Mr. Red Owl, Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe) (stating that 85 cents on every
dollar allocated to tribal contracting remains with the BIA and IHS); see also McClellan,
supra note 198, at 45, 46–48 (explaining that bureaucrats interpreted the Act to stall its
implementation and created veto points within the contract review process to frustrate
tribal efforts to enter into self-determination contracts); Stuart, supra note 204, at 5–6
(describing the most common early criticisms as focused on how bureaucrats within the
BIA and other agencies had thwarted implementation of the policy by manipulating the
policy to increase their control over Indian nations and insisting that they review all tribal
decisions). McClellan provides a detailed—and fascinating—account of the bureaucratic
resistance to implementing the ISDEAA. McClellan, supra note 198, at 47.
228. Chuck Cook, Mike Masterson, & M.N. Trahant, Fraud in Indian Country: A BillionDollar Betrayal, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 4–11, 1987 (series of thirty articles).
229. Ultimately, they led to oversight hearings on the BIA by other congressional
committees. Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 204, at 1267 n.69.
230. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1987, supra
note 207, at 1 (Sen. Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman, S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs); see also
Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 204, at 1266–68.
231. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1988,
H.R. 1223, 100th Cong. (1988); Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act
Amendments, S. 1703, 100th Cong. (1987).
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result of consultation with tribes at the proposal development
stage, these bills responded to concerns raised by tribes and
incorporated ideas presented by tribal advocates at the
1987 hearing.232
The two hearings held by the Senate Select Committee on
Indian Affairs on the proposed legislation reveal the influence of
tribes on the amendment process. At the outset of the first
hearing, Senator Inouye identified tribes as the experts in the area
and asked them to submit any recommendations for changes to
the proposed legislation to the committee.233 Indian nations
testified in support of the Senate bill at the two hearings.234 They
reiterated many of their concerns about how failure to implement
the ISDEAA threatened tribal sovereignty by undermining the
ability of tribes to provide high-quality services to their citizens.
They emphasized the need for Congress to ensure the full funding
of contract support and indirect costs,235 provide liability

232. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1987, supra
note 207, at 1–2 (Sen. Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman, S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs)
(“This bill addresses many tribal concerns, and they include: the need for the Bureau of
Indian Affairs and the Indian Health Service to fully fund tribal indirect costs for selfdetermination contracts; the need for year-to-year stability of contract funding levels in
order to improve planning and management of programs; clarifying that Federal
acquisition regulations do not apply to self-determination contracts; allowing tribes that
have successfully operated programs for 3 or more years, and that have clean audits, to
enter into 5-year mature contracts; reducing the paperwork and reporting requirements for
mature contracts; alleviating problems associated with over-recovery and under-recovery
of indirect costs from Federal agencies other than the BIA and IHS; and approving avenues
for contract appeals and conflict resolution.”). Many tribal witnesses applauded the
Committee for its consultation with tribes in crafting the bill. See, e.g., id. at 24 (statement of
Suzan Shown Harjo, Executive Director, National Congress of American Indians); id. at 27
(statement of Hon. Billy Frank, Chairman, Northwest Indian Fishing Commission); id. at 37
(statement of Joseph Delacruz, President, Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians).
233. Id. at 2.
234. Id.; see also Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of
1987—Part II: Hearing on S. 1703 Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 100th
Cong. (1987).
235. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1987, supra
note 207, at 29 (statement of Stanley Paytiamo, All Indian Pueblos); id. at 41 (statement of
Clarence Skye, United Sioux Tribes); id. at 43 (statement of Margaret Roberts, Alaska Indian
Health Board); id. at 47 (statement of Anthony Drennan, Intertribal Council of Arizona).
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insurance for contractors,236 and enable tribes to obtain technical
assistance from outside of federal agencies.237
Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs (ASIA) Ross Swimmer
testified against the Senate bill, proposing that the BIA “step out
of the picture and put the budget with the tribes and let them
carry out the responsibility.”238 He expanded on this idea in
testimony before the House Subcommittee on Interior Appropriations.239 He proposed a program of true self-determination, in
which “tribes would have complete autonomy in determining
what programs would be provided.”240 Rather than continue to
allow tribes to contract for programs previously run by the BIA,
ASIA Swimmer recommended that the federal government grant
funds to the tribes to operate programs of their own choosing and
that if the tribes did not want to run the programs, they could
contract with the BIA to do it.241
Members of the Alliance of American Indian Leaders, who
had heard ASIA Swimmer’s proposal wanted to test out its core
idea of giving tribes “the federal funds to manage their own
affairs completely.”242 These tribal leaders adapted ASIA
Swimmer’s idea into their own proposal for a Tribal SelfGovernance Demonstration Project that would allow tribes to
compact for the operation of several government programs (rather
than contract for each individually), minimize BIA oversight of
tribal programs, and maximize tribal flexibility in designing
236. Id. at 29 (statement of Stanley Paytiamo, Governor, Acoma Pueblo Tribe); id. at 25
(statement of Lionel John, Executive Director, United South and Eastern Tribes); id. at 42
(statement of Margaret Roberts, Board Member, Alaska Native Health Board).
237. Id. at 25 (statement of Lionel John, Executive Director, United South and Eastern
Tribes); Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1987—Part II,
supra note 234, at 56 (statement of Hon. William Ron Allen, Chairman, Jamestown
Klallam Tribe).
238. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1987—Part II,
supra note 234, at 28 (statement of Ross O. Swimmer, Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs,
United States Department of the Interior).
239. News Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Secretary Hodel Calls for Unified Effort to
Improve Federal Programs Serving Indian Tribes (Oct. 27, 1987), https://www.bia.gov
/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/public/press_release/pdf/idc-022499.pdf (quoting statement of
Ross O. Swimmer, Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, before the House Subcommittee
on Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations).
240. Id. at 4.
241. Id.
242. Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 204, at 1267.
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programs and allocating resources. They initiated a multi-front
strategy, targeting both the House Subcommittee on Interior
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs. The
tribes entered into discussions with the Department of Interior,
Chairman Sidney Yates (D-IL) of the House Subcommittee on
Interior Appropriations, and Senators Inouye and Evans of the
Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs about the possibility of
a demonstration project in mid-October 1987.243 They convinced
the House Subcommittee on Interior Appropriations to increase
the 1988 BIA budget by $1 million to support a Tribal SelfGovernance Demonstration Project.244
As members of the Alliance of American Indian Leaders
negotiated with members of Congress to create a Tribal SelfGovernance Demonstration Project, H.R. 1223 continued to
progress through the House of Representatives. Tribal advocacy
informed many of the amendments the House Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs made to H.R. 1223 before reporting it
out on October 26, 1987.245 For example, sections three and eight
responded to tribal concerns about contract support and indirect
costs by defining terms and requiring that “the amount of funds
provided under contracts shall be no less than the amount the
appropriate Secretary would have otherwise provided for his
administration of the program.”246 The House passed H.R. 1223 on
October 27, 1987.
Similarly, the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs amended
the Senate version of the legislation, S. 1703, to incorporate many
of the recommendations made by tribal leaders before reporting it
out in December 1987. S. 1703 responded to tribal concerns by,
inter alia, adding a new section to protect contract funding levels
provided to tribes and prevent diversion of funds provided for
contracts to pay for costs incurred by the federal government,247

243. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1987, supra
note 207, at 1–2 (statement of Sen. Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman, S. Select Comm. on Indian
Affairs); Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 204, at 1267; Strommer & Osborne, supra note 10,
at 31.
244. H.R. REP. NO. 100-498 (1987); Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 204, at 1267.
245. H.R. REP. NO. 100-393 (1987); S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 29 (1987).
246. H.R. REP. NO. 100-393, at 6.
247. S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 29.
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clarifying that self-determination contracts are not governed by
federal procurement laws,248 expanding the availability of
technical assistance so that tribes could seek assistance outside the
federal government,249 and obligating the BIA and IHS to obtain
liability insurance for tribal contracts.250 The amended S. 1703 also
acknowledged tribal interests in consolidating contracts into one
block grant of BIA programs by authorizing a demonstration
project to consolidate funding contracts for Indian tribes.251
Tribes continued to work with Senator Evans as the Senate
considered H.R. 1223, which had already passed in the House. In
May 1988, the Senate incorporated the amended version of S. 1703
into H.R. 1223. Senator Evans then proposed an amendment that
he had crafted with input from the tribes to the demonstration
project provisions, and it passed.252 The Senate then passed
H.R. 1223, and the House concurred in the Senate amendments to
the bill. President Reagan signed the bill into law.
Sustained tribal advocacy played an integral role in the crafting and enactment of the Indian Self-Determination Amendments
of 1988. Congress repeatedly expressed its commitment to
working with tribes to improve the implementation of selfdetermination contracts and its expectation that the BIA and IHS
would do the same.253 Congress responded to tribal concerns
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. at 29.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 39; Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of
1987, supra note 207, at 1–2 (statement of Sen. Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman, S. Select Comm.
on Indian Affairs) (detailing tribal interest in consolidating grants). The self-governance
demonstration project resembled a proposal for reworking the contracting process initially
made during the 1987 hearing as well as responded to the requests made by the Alliance of
American Indian Leaders. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Public Law
93-638: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 100th Cong. 109 (1987) (testimony
of Eric Eberhard). The Senate Committee on Indian Affairs acknowledged tribal interest in
and concerns about the demonstration project. S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 64 (additional views
of Senator Evans). The Committee then held a hearing on the demonstration project
provisions in the proposed legislation to hear all relevant perspectives. Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1987, supra note 207, at 2.
252. 134 CONG. REC. S7112; Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act
Amendments of 1987, supra note 207, at 2 (statement of Sen. Daniel J. Evans, Vice Chairman,
S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs).
253. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1987, supra
note 207, at 1–2 (1987) (statement of Sen. Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman, S. Select Comm. on
Indian Affairs) (expressing the intent of the committee to work with tribes in drafting
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about the BIA and IHS acting without their consent by instructing
the agencies “to work closely with tribes” in the promulgation of
self-determination contract regulations.254
Congress also responded to substantive tribal concerns by
amending the ISDEAA to improve the contracting process and
creating the self-governance demonstration project.255 Congress
strengthened the contracting process by listening to the tribes and
amending the ISDEAA to clarify and protect contract funding
levels,256 lessen the administrative burdens of contracting,257
expand the availability of technical assistance,258 and obligate the
BIA and IHS to obtain liability insurance for tribal contracts.259 It
also enacted a self-governance demonstration project, which
expanded the types of programs and responsibilities that participating tribes could administer, minimized oversight of tribal
programs by federal agencies, and maximized flexibility for tribes
to redesign programs and reallocate resources in their agreements.260 The self-governance demonstration project allowed for
tribes to bundle programs into one compact rather than contract
separately for each of them.261
Tribes forged a relationship with members of Congress in
advocating for implementation of the ISDEAA in the late 1980s.
This relationship produced the 1988 amendments, which largely
reflected tribal input into how the agencies could improve their
implementation of the ISDEAA to protect and further promote
tribal sovereignty as Congress originally intended. Tribes learned

amendments and explaining how the committee consulted tribes in drafting amendments);
S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 38, 40 (instructing the BIA and IHS to collaborate with tribes on selfdetermination contract regulations).
254. S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 38. Scholars have identified Congress’s instructions to the
IHS and the BIA to collaborate with tribes as a form of oversight. Beerman, supra note 186,
at 125.
255. Strommer & Osborne, supra note 10, at 30–31.
256. S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 29.
257. Id. at 29.
258. Id. at 28.
259. Id. at 27.
260. Id.
261. For example, if a tribe administers BIA education and realty programs and wants
to administer its own health clinic, it can compact for all these programs rather than
contract for each one separately. Tribes, thus, had a choice either to contract or compact
with the federal government.
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from their success in amending the ISDEAA in 1988 and have
managed to keep Congress engaged in oversight in this area.262
The Senate Committee on Indian Affairs acknowledged the
working relationship that it had developed with tribes in the
process of amending the ISDEAA by holding an oversight hearing
in 1989 to hear testimony, inter alia, on regulations to implement
the 1988 Amendments, the status of the demonstration project,
and the federal government’s provision of liability insurance to
tribal contractors.263 At the hearing, tribal witnesses lamented the
struggles they faced collaborating with the BIA and IHS in
crafting regulations,264 but they overwhelmingly testified in favor
of the demonstration project despite BIA reluctance in implementing it.265
As early as 1989, tribes identified the self-governance project
as advancing tribal sovereignty and started advocating to have it
extended and made permanent.266 Congress responded to the
262. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination Contract Reform Act of 1994: Hearing on S. 2036
Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 103d Cong. 39 (1994) (statement of Lloyd Miller,
Partner, Sonosky Chambers Law Firm) (“We have been working on this for the past 8
years. We worked 2 years with the committee to develop the 1988 amendments. We came
back to this committee, regrettably, to work on the 1990 amendments, unfortunately
distracting the committee’s time due to the intransigence of the agencies. We came back to
this committee in the last Congress to deal once again with a draft bill that did not pass the
Senate. And now we are back again both with your bill and Senator Inouye’s
separate bill.”).
263. Implementation of Amendments to the Indian Self-Determination Act: Hearing Before
the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 101st Cong. 1–2 (statement of Sen. Daniel K. Inouye,
Chairman, S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs) (1989). Senator Inouye explained that
Congress planned on monitoring implementation of the 1988 Amendments. Id. His
statement suggests that the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs may have
intentionally increased the attention paid to implementation of the ISDEAA after 1988.
264. Id. at 2–6, 19 (statement of Hon. William Ron Allen, Chairman, Jamestown
Klallam Tribe) (describing the agencies’ communications and interactions with the tribes as
poor); id. at 7–10 (statement of Lionel John, Executive Director, United South and Eastern
Tribes) (explaining that the agencies are not open to tribal suggestions); id. at 12–16
(statement of S. Bobo Dean, Hobbs, Strauss, Dean & Wilder) (expressing concerns that
many positions taken by the IHS and BIA either contradict or are not supported by the
ISDEAA and its amendments).
265. See, e.g., id. at 229 (prepared statement of Hon. Edward K. Thomas, President,
Central Council of Tlingit and Haida Tribes) (“On balance, the Demonstration Project has
been a very positive tool for my tribe. . . .”).
266. Id. at 229–30 (prepared statement of Hon. Edward K. Thomas, President, Central
Council of Tlingit and Haida Tribes) (suggesting that the demonstration project will lead to
permanent legislation changing the relationships between tribes and the federal
government and advocating that more tribes be included in it); Tribal Self-Governance Act of
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tribes by reauthorizing and expanding the self-governance project
in 1991,267 extending it to Indian Health Service in 1992,268 and
making it permanent in 1994.269 In addition to making the selfgovernance project permanent, Congress included several other
provisions in the Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of
1994 that addressed tribal concerns.270 For example, the 1994 Act
responded to tribal complaints about the agencies’ failure to
engage tribes in the rulemaking process by including language
mandating that the agencies enter into negotiated rulemaking
with the tribes pursuant to the Negotiated Rulemaking Act
of 1990.271
1993: Hearing on H.R. 3508 and S. 1618 Before the Subcomm. on Native Am. Affairs of the H.
Comm. on Nat. Res., 103d Cong. 47 (1994) (prepared statement of Hon. Marge Anderson,
Chief Executive, Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe) (supporting bill to make the self-governance
demonstration program permanent); id. at 86 (prepared statement of Hon. Edward K.
Thomas, President, Central Council of Tlingit and Haida Indian Tribes); id. at 88 (statement
of Hon. Christine Collison, President, Ketchikan Indian Corp.); id. at 93 (statement of Hon.
Larry Nuckolls, Governor, Absentee Shawnee Tribe); id. at 117–18 (statement of Hon.
George E. Bennett, Tribal Council Member, Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa
Indians); id. at 126 (statement of Hon. Dale Risling, Chairman, Hoopa Valley Tribe).
Fourteen tribes testified for making the self-governance demonstration project
permanent at a House Subcommittee on Native American Affairs hearing in 1994. Tribal
Self-Governance Act of 1993, supra (statements of the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe,
Tlingit and Haida Indian Tribes Central Council, Ketchikan Indian Community, Absentee
Shawnee Tribe of Oklahoma, Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa-Chippewa, Hoopa Valley
Tribe, Lummi Indian Nation, Quinault Indian Nation, Makah Indian Tribe, Chickasaw
Nation, Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, Navajo Nation, Lower Elwha S’Klallam
Tribe, and Jamestown S’Klallam Tribe). One tribe testified against the 1994 Amendments.
Id. at 104–05 (statement of Hon. Herbert M. Whitish, Chairman, Shoalwater Bay Tribe)
(arguing that the legislation is premature and does not protect tribal rights). The House
Committee took the comments of these tribal leaders very seriously. Id. at 123–25.
267. Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration Project of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-184, 105
Stat. 1278 (repealed by 2001 Act).
268. Indian Health Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-573, 106 Stat. 4526
(repealed 2000).
269. Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413. For a
discussion of the events leading up to the enactment of the Indian Self-Determination Act
Amendments of 1994, see Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 204, at 1269–70; Strommer &
Osborne, supra note 10, at 34–36.
270. A full analysis of the Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994 is
beyond the scope of this Article. For analyses of the Act and how it changed the law, see
Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 204, at 1269–77; Strommer & Osborne, supra note 10, at 35–
39.
271. Indian Self-Determination Contract Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413,
§ 105(d) (Oct. 25, 1994). Tribes had proposed amending the statutory language as early as
1989. Implementation of Amendments to the Indian Self-Determination Act, supra note 263, at 9
(statement of Lionel John, Executive Director, United South and Eastern Tribes) (“While it
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Tribal advocacy led Congress to make the demonstration program, which allowed tribes to compact to operate IHS programs,
permanent in 2000.272 Tribes started lobbying for legislation to
make the IHS self-governance program permanent in 1996.273
Tribes, the IHS, other executive branch agencies, and congressional staffers collaborated over the next several years to draft and
enact a bill.274 In response to these efforts, Representatives George

was addressed in the report language, there was no specific language in the amendment
that required the two agencies to come up with common regulations. We think that in
order to make this happen, then the language must be inserted; otherwise, it will continue
to wander around. We think that we need to see some language to kind of shepherd that
along.”). Senator Inouye expressed hope in 1989 that Congress would not have to amend
the statutory language because the agencies would comply with Congress’s previous
instructions to collaborate with the tribes. Id. at 19 (“We can tighten up the language, but I
would hope that that would not be necessary.”). Tribes had continually informed Congress
about the agencies’ failures to engage them in the rulemaking process as required by
Congress in the 1988 Amendments. Id. at 2–6, 19 (statement of Hon. William Ron Allen,
Chairman, Jamestown Klallam Tribe); id. at 7–10 (statement of Lionel John, Executive
Director, United South and Eastern Tribes); id. at 12–16 (statement of S. Bobo Dean, Hobbs,
Strauss, Dean & Wilder); Proposed Regulations to Implement the 1988 Amendments to the Indian
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs,
103d Cong. 70–129 (1993); see, e.g., Indian Self-Determination Contract Reform Act of 1994,
supra note 262, at 39 (statement of Lloyd Miller, Partner, Sonosky Chambers Law Firm)
(“[T]he regulation process has been a disaster.”); id. at 31–33 (statement of Carol Evans,
Chief Financial Officer, Spokane Tribe of Indians); id. at 27 (statement of Phillip Martin,
Chief, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians); id. at 37 (Britt Clapham, Senior Assistant
Att’y Gen., Navajo Nation Department of Justice); Delaney, supra note 207, at 333. Tribes
also submitted comments in opposition to the proposed regulations. Id. By 1994, the
agencies still had not promulgated regulations and the rulemaking process had completely
deteriorated. Indian Self-Determination Contract Reform Act of 1994, supra note 262, at 1
(statement of Sen. John McCain, Vice Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs). Senators
McCain and Inouye introduced S. 2036, which would have prohibited the agencies from
enacting regulations at all. Id.
272. Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, 114 Stat. 711.
273. Strommer & Osborne, supra note 10, at 41. Based on recommendations made by
the self-governance tribes, the Director of the Indian Health Service created a taskforce, the
Tribal Self-Governance Advisory Committee, to provide information, education, and policy
guidance for implementation of self-governance within the IHS that same year. IHS
TSGAC, TRIBALSELFGOV.ORG, https://www.tribalselfgov.org/advisory-committees/ihs-tsgac
(last visited Feb. 2, 2019). A similar DOI Tribal Self-Governance Advisory Committee was
formally sanctioned by the ASIA in 1998. DOI SGAC, TRIBALSELFGOV.ORG, https://www.
tribalselfgov.org/advisory-committees/doi-sgac (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
274. Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 1998: Hearing on H.R. 1833 Before the S.
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 105th Cong. 85–86 (1998) (testimony of Henry M. Cagey, Chairman,
Lummi Indian Nation) (describing the federal-tribal consultative process in drafting and
revising the bill over a two-year period); Self-Governance: Hearing on S. 979 Before the S.
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 63–64 (1999) (statement of Michael Lincoln, Deputy
Director, Indian Health Service).
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Miller (D-CA) and Don Young (R-AK) introduced several bills,
which included provisions worked out among tribes, congressional staffers, and agency officials.275
Tribal leaders advocated for the legislation by overwhelmingly testifying in support of making the IHS self-governance
program permanent during the Senate hearing.276 After the
hearing, they worked closely with congressional staffers and
agency officials to resolve differences between the House and
Senate versions of the bill.277 A version of the Senate bill amended
to incorporate the tribally supported provisions in the House bill
became law on August 18, 2000.278
Tribes have consistently lobbied Congress for amendments to
ensure the full funding of tribal contract support costs. By the late
1990s, the tribal under-recovery of contract support costs and
congressional underfunding of these costs had grown exponentially.279 This lack of funding of these administrative costs forced

275. Representatives Miller and Young introduced House Bill 1833, which passed the
House but was not scheduled for Senate action prior to the adjournment of Congress.
Strommer & Osborne, supra note 10, at 40–42. Some attributed the failure of H.R. 1833 to
issues dealing with contract support costs. See, e.g., Self-Governance: Hearing on S. 979, supra
note 274, at 71 (statement of Henry Cagey, Chairman, Self-Governance Tribal Advisory
Task Force). The Senate Committee on Indian Affairs hearing on H.R. 1833 confirms that
Senator Slade Gorton (R-WA) raised serious concerns about contract support costs and
opposed the bill. Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 1998, supra note 274, at 47 (statement
of Sen. Slade Gorton); id. at 86 (testimony of Henry M. Cagey, Chairman, Lummi Indian
Nation) (noting that several senators opposed the bill because the contract support cost
issue remained unresolved).
The failure of H.R. 1833 did not discourage tribes. Representatives Miller and Young
introduced H.R. 1167 in the 106th Congress. H.R. 1167, 106th Cong. (1999). H.R. 1167
included all the revisions worked out among tribes, congressional staffers, and agency
officials in the previous session. Strommer & Osborne, supra note 10, at 41. The bill quickly
passed the House, and Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell introduced a companion bill,
S. 979, in the Senate. Id.
276. Self-Governance: Hearing on S. 979, supra note 274, at 63–64 (1999) (statement of
Michael Lincoln, Deputy Director, Indian Health Service).
277. Strommer & Osborne, supra note 10, at 41–42.
278. Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, 114 Stat. 711.
279. Dean & Webster, supra note 204, at 364–66. Unpaid contract support costs
undermined the advances made to tribal sovereignty through the ISDEAA because tribes
were forced to divert program funds to pay for them. See id. at 366 (describing the entire
policy of tribal self-determination as at risk); Contract Support Costs Within the Indian Health
Service and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (Part II): Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Resources,
106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter Contract Support Costs (Part II)].
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some tribes to limit their programs, leaving tribal needs unmet.280
Other tribes were deterred from contracting or compacting for
federal programs and still others started threatening to retrocede
programs back to the BIA and IHS.281
Tribes responded to the crisis by increasing their advocacy for
Congress to resolve the problem and fully fund contract support
costs.282 The NCAI mounted a two-pronged strategy, pushing for
an increase in appropriations for contract support funding for
fiscal year 1999283 and for legislation to provide a permanent
indefinite appropriation to fund contract support costs.284
Congress responded by increasing appropriations for contract
support costs in fiscal years 1999, 2000, and 2001.285 While
increases in appropriations provided some temporary relief, they
did not permanently fix contract support cost shortfalls. Thus,
tribes continued to seek legislation to resolve the issue. Tribes
helped to craft and supported proposed legislation in both 2000
and 2004.286

280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Contract Support Costs (Part II), supra note 279.
Id.
Dean & Webster, supra note 204, at 366.
Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 106-837, at 5 (2000).
Congress appropriated substantially more in contract support funding for the
IHS and slightly more for the BIA for fiscal year 1999. Dean & Webster, supra note 204, at
366–67. Unfortunately, these increases did not fully cover the contract support cost
shortfalls. Id. Concerned over these costs and the lack of progress toward a resolution to the
funding problem, Congress brought the contracting process to a halt for the first time in
almost twenty-five years. INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION CONTRACTING: SHORTFALLS IN
CONTRACT SUPPORT COSTS AND ALTERNATIVES FOR FUNDING THEM 1 (Sept. 15, 1999) (U.S.
Gen. Accounting Office Release GAO/T-RCED-99-287) (statement of Jim Wells, Director,
Energy, Resources, and Science Issues, before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs)
https://www.gao.gov/store1999/rc99287t.pdf. It imposed a mandatory cap on the total
amount of contract support cost funding for new and expanded programs and placed a
one-year moratorium barring the Secretary from entering into new ISDEAA contracts in
fiscal year 1999. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 314, 112 Stat. 2681-288 (1999).
NCAI applauded the increased appropriations while lobbying for more funding for
fiscal year 2000 and an end to the moratorium. Dean & Webster, supra note 204, at 369.
NCAI raised awareness about the problem by issuing a report detailing the historic and
ongoing problems that the contract support cost shortfalls caused for tribes. Id. Congress
lifted the moratorium and continued to increase contract support funding in 2000 and 2001.
Id. at 370.
286. Members of Congress responded to tribal concerns by introducing legislation to
clarify that the federal commitment to fund contract support costs is not subject to annual
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In the early 2000s, tribes lobbied Congress while simultaneously litigating against the Departments of the Interior and
Health and Human Services to recover contract support cost
shortfalls.287 They increased their lobbying after the Supreme
Court held—for the second time—that Congress had to fully pay
tribal contract support costs.288 The tribes defeated the Obama

appropriations and to provide a permanent indefinite appropriation to pay the reasonable
amount of negotiated contract support costs. H.R. 4148, 106th Cong. (2000). Members of
Congress also held multiple hearings on contract support costs in 1999, see, e.g., SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act and Contract Support Costs: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. (1999); Contract Support Costs Within the Indian Health
Service Annual Budget: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Resources, 106th Cong. (1999); Contract
Support Costs (Part II), supra note 279, and requested a GAO study on the problem. See Dean
& Webster, supra note 204, at 369. Tribes actively helped to draft the Tribal Contract
Support Cost Technical Amendments of 2000, H.R. REP. NO. 106-837, at 5 (2000), and they
reiterated their support for the bill by uniformly testifying for it before the House
Committee on Resources. See H.R. 946, 2671, and H.R. 4148 (Young, R-AK)—To Make
Technical Amendments to the Provisions of the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act Relating to Contract Support Costs, and for Other Purposes. “Tribal Contract
Support Cost Technical Amendments of 2000”: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Res., 106th Cong.
(2000) (testimony of the National Congress of American Indians, Yukon Kuskokwim
Health Corporation, Cherokee Nation, Gila River Indian Community, Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians, and several school boards within the Navajo Nation in favor of the bill)
(no American Indians or tribes testified against the bill).
With tribal input and support, members of Congress again introduced legislation in
2004 that would have mandated a permanent appropriation for tribal contract support
costs, but the bill failed to pass both houses. Tribal Contract Support Cost Technical
Amendments, S. 2172, 108th Cong. (2004).
287. The Cherokee Nation and Shoshone-Paiute Tribes of the Duck Valley
Reservation brought administrative claims under the Contract Disputes Act against the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, alleging that the Secretary had failed to pay all of
the contract support costs associated with their IHS compacts as required by ISDEAA.
Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Thompson, 311 F.3d 1054, 1059 (10th Cir. 2002). The administrative process failed to resolve the issue, and the tribes brought suit in federal court in
March 1999. Id. at 1059–60. The Cherokee Nation pursued similar administrative claims
against the Secretary of the Interior. Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 636
(2005). When the Board of Contract Appeals ordered that the Secretary pay the Cherokee
Nation $8.5 million in damages, the federal government sought review in the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Id. The Supreme Court consolidated these cases and
affirmed the lower court finding that the ISDEAA required the federal government to pay
tribal contract support costs subject to the availability of appropriations in 2005. Id. at 634.
The Ramah Navajo Chapter and the Arctic Slope Native Association filed lawsuits to
determine the meaning of the “subject to availability of appropriations” language when a
spending cap is in place. James J. Linhardt, The Ball Is in Congress’s Court: Contract Support
Costs Following Ramah, 37 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 203, 205 (2012). In 2012, the Supreme Court
reiterated its earlier mandate that Congress pay tribal support costs in Salazar v. Ramah
Navajo Chapter, 567 U.S. 182, 185 (2012).
288. Ramah, 567 U.S. at 185.
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Administration’s fiscal year 2014 proposal that Congress eliminate
the rights of tribes to full contract support funding.289 Tribal
pressure finally led to full funding of contract support costs from
both agencies as separate, indefinite appropriations starting in
fiscal year 2016.290
Tribes have continued to keep issues related to the implementation of contracting and compacting on the congressional
agenda even though Congress last enacted major amendments to
the ISDEAA in 2000. In response to tribal advocacy, congressional
committees have held numerous hearings related to contracting
and compacting,291 and members of Congress have introduced
multiple bills to address various implementation issues.292 Tribes

289. Mary Pavel, Contract Support Costs Under the Indian Self-Determination Act:
The Post-Cherokee-Ramah Full Funding Era, Presentation to the Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians, http://atnitribes.org/sites/default/files/MJP%20CSC%20powerpoint%20
%20for%20ATNI_0.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2019). Tribes criticized the administration for
proposing the policy without consulting tribes and urged the government to negotiate with
tribes in good faith. Contract Support Costs and Sequestration: Fiscal Crisis in Indian Country:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Phyliss J.
Anderson, Tribal Chief, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians); id. (statement of Brian
Cladoosby, President, National Congress of American Indians).
290. See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat.
2242, 2538 (BIA), 2566 (IHS).
291. See, e.g., The 30th Anniversary of Tribal Self-Governance: Successes in Self-Governance
and an Outlook for the Next 30 Years: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 115th Cong.
(2018); S. 919, the Department of Interior Tribal Self-Governance Act of 2013: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 113th Cong. (2014); H.R. 4347, Department of the Interior Tribal
Self-Governance Act of 2009: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Nat. Res., 111th Cong. (2010); H.R.
4347, To Amend the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act to Provide Further
Self-Governance by Indian Tribes and for Other Purposes: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 111th Cong. (2010); The Success and Shortfall of Self-Governance Under the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act After Twenty Years: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. 3994, the Department of Interior Tribal Self-Governance
Act of 2007: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Nat. Res., 110th Cong. (2007); Tribal SelfGovernance: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter
Tribal Self-Governance (2006)]; Department of the Interior and the Department of Health and
Human Services Tribal Self-Governance Act: Hearing on S. 1715 and S. 1696 Before the S. Comm.
on Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. (2004); Tribal Contract Support Cost Technical Amendments:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs on S. 2172, 108th Cong. (2004); Tribal SelfGovernance: Oversight Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Res., 108th Cong. (2003).
292. PROGRESS for Indian Tribes Act, S. 2515, 115th Cong. (2018); Department of the
Interior Tribal Self-Governance Act of 2014, H.R. 4546, 113th Cong. (2014); Department of
Interior Tribal Self-Governance Act of 2013, S. 919, 113th Cong. (2014); Department of the
Interior Tribal Self-Governance Act of 2012, S. 3685, 112th Cong. (2012); Department of the
Interior Tribal Self-Governance Act of 2011, H.R. 2444, 112th Cong. (2011); Department of
the Interior Tribal Self-Governance Act of 2010, H.R. 4347, 111th Cong. (2010); Department
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have continuously advocated for a solution to the ongoing shortfalls in contract support costs,293 an expansion of self-governance
programs beyond the BIA and the IHS,294 and an amendment to
the ISDEAA that would streamline the Department of the
Interior’s process for approving self-governance compacts by
aligning it with the process used by the IHS.295 Members of
Congress have responded to these requests by introducing bills
proposing to amend Title IV to make it consistent with the process
used by the IHS296 and to expand self-governance programs

of Interior Tribal Self-Governance Act of 2007, H.R. 3994, 110th Cong. (2007); Tribal
Contract Support Cost Technical Amendments of 2004, S. 2172, 108th Cong. (2004);
Department of the Interior Tribal Self-Governance Act of 2004, S. 1715, 108th Cong. (2004).
293. See, e.g., The 30th Anniversary of Tribal Self-Governance: Successes in Self-Governance
and an Outlook for the Next 30 Years, supra note 291 (statement of Melanie Benjamin, Mille
Lacs Band of Ojibwe) (noting the need to resolve funding issues, expand tribal selfgovernance programs, and enact amendments to Title IV); Contract Support Costs and
Sequestration: Fiscal Crisis in Indian Country, supra note 289 (statement of Phyliss J.
Anderson, Tribal Chief, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians); id. (statement of Brian
Cladoosby, President, National Congress of American Indians); Tribal Self-Governance
(2006), supra note 291, at 11–13 (statement of Floyd Jourdain, Jr., Chairman, Red Lake Band
of Chippewa Indians of Minnesota) (raising issues related to contract support costs and
advocating for their resolution).
294. See, e.g., Department of the Interior and the Department of Health and Human Services
Tribal Self-Governance Act, supra note 291; The 30th Anniversary of Tribal Self-Governance:
Successes in Self-Governance and an Outlook for the Next 30 Years, supra note 291 (statement of
Melanie Benjamin, Chief Executive, Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe) (noting the need to resolve
funding issues, expand tribal self-governance programs, and enact amendments to Title
IV); id. (statement of Arthur “Butch” Blazer, President, Mescalero Apache Tribe) (urging
Congress to extend self-governance programs to the USDA).
295. See, e.g., The 30th Anniversary of Tribal Self-Governance: Successes in Self-Governance
and an Outlook for the Next 30 Years, supra note 291 (statement of Melanie Benjamin, Chief
Executive, Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe) (noting the need to resolve funding issues, expand
tribal self-governance programs, and enact amendments to Title IV); Tribal Self-Governance
(2006), supra note 291 at 3–4 (George Skibine, Department of Interior) (mentioning that the
BIA and tribes were working together on an amendment to Title IV); id. at 14 (statement of
Melanie Benjamin, Chairwoman, Mille Lac Band Assembly) (urging amendments to Title
IV); id. at 11–12 (statement of Floyd Jourdain, Jr., Chairman, Red Lake Band of Chippewa
Indians of Minnesota) (supporting amendments to Title IV).
296. See, e.g., Department of the Interior Tribal Self-Governance Act of 2004, S. 1715,
108th Cong. (2004); Department of Interior Self-Governance Act of 2010, H.R. 4347, 111th
Cong. (2010); Department of Interior Self-Governance Act of 2011, H.R. 2444, 112th Cong.
(2011); Department of Interior Self-Governance Act of 2012, S. 3685, 112th Cong. (2012);
Department of Interior Self-Governance Act of 2013, S. 919, 113th Cong. (2014); Department
of Interior Self-Governance Act of 2014, H.R. 4546, 113th Cong. (2014); Department of
Interior Self-Governance Act of 2015, S. 286, 114th Cong. (2015); PROGRESS for Indian
Tribes Act, S. 2515, 115th Cong. (2018).
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beyond the BIA.297 Most recently, Senators John Hoeven (R-ND)
and Tom Udall (D-NM) introduced the bipartisan Practical
Reforms and Other Goals to Reinforce the Effectiveness of SelfGovernance and Self-Determination (PROGRESS) for Indian
Tribes Act in March 2018.298 The product of several years of
negotiations among tribes, congressional staffers, and the BIA, the
PROGRESS for Indian Tribes Act would streamline the Department of the Interior’s self-governance process and provide tribes
with greater flexibility in administering federal programs. The
Senate passed the bill in September 2018.299
The case of the ISDEAA illustrates how Indian nations have
used advocacy to encourage legislative oversight. The multiple
oversight hearings that Congress has held on Indian affairs
suggest that many more examples of this may exist and merit
investigation. Tribes have and continue to actively employ
lobbying to facilitate Congress’s oversight of self-determination
contracting and self-governance compacting.300 In the 1980s, tribes
used lobbying to notify Congress of problems with the
implementation of the ISDEAA.301 They pushed Congress to
reaffirm its commitment to tribal sovereignty by overseeing
agency implementation of the ISDEAA. Congress responded to
Tribes have continuously worked with congressional staffers and the BIA to craft
legislation acceptable to all parties involved. Strommer & Osborne, supra note 10, at 61–62
(documenting tribal efforts and bills introduced to amend Title IV through 2014); S. REP.
NO. 114-060, at 2–4 (2015) (detailing the history of legislative proposals to amend Title IV).
297. Department of Health and Human Services Tribal Self-Governance Amendments
Act of 2004, S. 1696, 108th Cong. (2004); see also Strommer & Osborne, supra note 10, at 47
(discussing S. 1696 and its demise). Strommer and Osborne suggest that expansion,
especially outside of BIA programs, is a contentious issue. Id. at 62. Recent bills have not
included provisions either expanding or limiting the scope of federal programs eligible for
inclusion in self-governance agreements. S. REP. NO. 114-060, at 4 (2015). The Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs, however, has noted that current law gives the Secretary of
the Interior wide discretion over what programs to include and has commended the
Secretary on the few occasions that it has expanded self-governance agreements to include
more programs. Id.
298. PROGRESS for Indian Tribes Act, S. 2515, 115th Cong. (2018).
299. Hoeven, Udall Announce Committee Passage of Progress for Indian Tribes Act, NATV
NEWS (Apr. 11, 2018), http://www.natvnews.com/hoevenudallannouncecommitteepassage
ofprogressforindiantribesact.html.
300. Delaney argues that tribes also used the 1995–96 negotiated rulemaking process
to improve implementation of the ISDEAA and its amendments. See Delaney, supra note
207, at 334.
301. See supra Section II.C.2.
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these concerns by holding multiple hearings, in which Senator
Inouye recognized tribes as experts in the implementation of
the ISDEAA.302
The tribal role in oversight of the ISDEAA, however, has
shifted over time. Tribes no longer serve only to sound the fire
alarm about problems in the implementation process.303 Rather,
through their continued advocacy, tribes have come to be an
integral voice in congressional oversight of self-determination
policy. Senator Inouye’s recognition of tribes as experts facilitated
this shift by suggesting that members of Congress should consult
tribes on how to improve implementation of the ISDEAA to fulfill
the statute’s goal of promoting tribal sovereignty.304 Members of
Congress have continued to invite tribal participation and have
developed a more collaborative approach to ISDEAA oversight
that includes extensive consultation with tribes. Moreover,
members of Congress have followed up with tribes on the
implementation of amendments.305 Members of Congress use
these hearings to press agencies to respond to tribal concerns.
These ongoing interactions among tribes and members of
Congress produce a reinforcing cycle of oversight over time.
Tribal lobbying has had concrete impacts on the ISDEAA
policy and its implementation.306 At least three times (1988, 1994,
302. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1987, supra
note 207, at 1.
303. The fire alarm theory of oversight suggests that interest groups serve to ring the
alarm when agencies fail to follow legislative mandates. McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note
185, at 166.
304. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1987, supra
note 207.
305. For example, the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs held an oversight hearing
in 1989 with the express purpose of monitoring implementation of the 1988 amendments.
See Implementation of Amendments to the Self-Determination Act: Hearing Before the S. Select
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 101st Cong. (1989) (explaining that Congress had planned on
monitoring implementation of the 1988 Amendments).
306. Tribes have actively engaged in tribal contracting and self-governance compacts.
Today, “more than 350 federally recognized tribes and consortia operate self-governance
programs.” FAQs, TRIBALSELFGOV.ORG, https://www.tribalselfgov.org/self-governance/faqs
(last visited Feb. 2, 2019). Similarly, “[a]s of July 2016, the IHS and Tribes have negotiated
90 self-governance compacts that are funded through 115 funding agreements with over
350 (or 60 percent) of the 567 federally recognized Tribes. This program constitutes
approximately $1.8 billion (or nearly 40 percent) of the IHS budget.” Tribal Self-Governance
Fact Sheets, INDIAN HEALTH SERV., https://www.ihs.gov/newsroom/index.cfm/factsheets
/tribalselfgovernance (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
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and 2000), tribal lobbying on oversight has led to significant
legislative reforms intended to improve implementation of tribal
self-governance programs and curbed agency departures from the
stated legislative goal of promoting tribal sovereignty. Tribal
lobbying has provided members of Congress with invaluable,
independent information about the implementation of selfgovernance programs.307 This information, in turn, has facilitated
better congressional oversight by undercutting the informational
advantages that agencies generally have in relation to Congress.
But tribes did not stop there. They engaged in the bill drafting and
amending process to produce policy changes meant to improve
self-governance programs and their implementation. Oversight
did not end with these legislative reforms but continued as tribes
and members of Congress continued to work together to ensure
successful implementation of the self-governance policy.
Even when tribal advocacy did not lead to legislative reforms,
lobbying affected the dynamics among the agencies and Congress.
Tribes significantly reduced the agencies’ informational advantages relative to Congress by presenting concrete evidence about
agency resistance to implementing the ISDEAA.308 On more than
one occasion, members of Congress used information supplied by
tribes to reprimand agencies for failures in the implementation
process.309 Moreover, they have often commended tribes for their
implementation of self-governance programs while chastising the
agencies for their failures.
In addition to highlighting how tribes have used lobbying to
increase congressional oversight, the case of the ISDEAA

307. See Richard L. Hall & Kristina C. Miler, What Happens After the Alarm? Interest
Group Subsidies to Legislative Overseers, 70 J. P OL. 990, 999–1002 (2008) (explaining that
interest groups subsidize oversight by providing legislators with information). For a
theoretical discussion of how groups use lobbying to help Congress control the
bureaucracy, see David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, A Theory of Strategic Oversight:
Congress, Lobbyists, and the Bureaucracy, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 227 (1995).
308. Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 307, at 236 (explaining how information
provided to legislators by interest groups counters the informational advantage
of agencies).
309. For example, Congress instructed the agencies to consult with tribes in crafting
regulations in the report to the 1988 Amendments. When the agencies failed to do this,
Congress mandated negotiated rulemaking in the 1994 Amendments. For a fuller
discussion of these events, see supra note 272.
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demonstrates the sophistication of tribal lobbying strategies. In
the 1980s, tribes developed and utilized a multi-pronged strategy
for enhancing implementation of the ISDEAA. Tribes adapted
their strategy from one that focused on the committees with jurisdiction over Indian affairs to targeting appropriations committees
as well. Tribes built alliances with members of Congress on both
committees to achieve their goal of creating a self-governance
demonstration project. They used the appropriations process to
direct agency action even if the ISDEAA was not amended to
include the self-governance demonstration project.310 The 1988
amendments reinforced this action and ensured the creation of the
demonstration project. Indian nations have continued to target
both committees in advancing further refinements to the
implementation of the ISDEAA and especially in their efforts to
obtain full funding for contract support costs.311 In the late 1990s,
tribes again altered their strategy by expanding their efforts to
resolve contract support cost shortfalls. They turned to the federal
courts and leveraged judicial power to encourage Congress to
address shortfalls in contract support costs.
III. UNDERSTANDING TRIBAL LOBBYING AS
A STRATEGY FOR TRIBAL RESILIENCE
Indian nations are fighting to survive as distinct peoples with
their own governments in a rapidly changing world. Lobbying is
part of this larger survival strategy. To the extent that tribes can
and do use lobbying to improve federal Indian policy, it is a
strategy for resilience.312
Lobbying serves as a strategy for tribal resilience by giving
voice to Indian nations. The case studies highlight the voices of
Indian nations as active participants in the political process. Tribal
actions have ensured tribal survival. Federal Indian law is not
something done to Indians, but emerges out of a complicated,
interactive process of encounters between Indians and non310. Beerman, supra note 186, at 84–90 (noting how interest groups obtain earmarks to
direct agency action).
311. See, e.g., Pavel, supra note 289.
312. COBB, supra note 30, at 59–69 (explaining that tribal activism has always been
about tribal self-determination and survival).
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Indians.313 Through lobbying, American Indians engage and
challenge the political system in a sustained effort to maintain
their sovereignty, culture, and identity. Congress is not merely a
foreign governmental institution but a site of contestation.314
The three case studies presented here illuminate some of the
various ways in which Indian nations have used lobbying as a
strategy for tribal resilience. Each case serves as an illustration of a
broader range of lobbying activities that Indian nations have
engaged in over time to protect their tribal sovereignty. The cases
demonstrate how tribes have harnessed strategies used by interest
groups within the American political system to advocate for
federal Indian laws and policies beneficial to them. Like interest
groups, Indian nations have used legislative advocacy to achieve
different goals.315 As the case studies show, Indian nations have
pushed back against potential encroachments on their sovereignty
by initiating new policies to ensure their continued survival,
seeking to reverse court decisions adverse to their interests, and
advocating for implementation of programs that foster their
development as tribal governments.316 Occasionally, they even
transform laws and policies to better reflect their interests.
The case studies provide some initial insights into how Indian
nations have used lobbying to foster tribal sovereignty in multiple
contexts.317 The cases when read together suggest that lobbying
strategies that encourage tribal resilience share common aspects.
These common aspects include, but may not be limited to, an
emphasis on protecting tribal sovereignty, persistence in pursuing
tribal goals, the development of sophisticated and adaptable

313. Id. at 60–61 (discussing how previous encounters between Indians and the BIA
can be described as mutual and reciprocal).
314. Neta Ziv, Cause Lawyers, Clients, and the State: Congress as a Forum for Cause
Lawyering During the Enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act, in CAUSE LAWYERING
AND THE STATE IN THE GLOBAL ERA 212 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001);
Frances Kahn Zemans, Legal Mobilization: The Neglected Role of the Law in the Political System,
77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 690 (1983).
315. LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE, supra note 60, at 78, 110–11; Making Strategic
Choices, supra note 36, at 948–58.
316. See supra Part II.
317. The presentation of multiple cases allows for comparative analysis across the
cases. Three cases do not provide definitive information, but they impart initial insights
into possible trends or patterns in tribal lobbying.
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strategies, and a commitment to building long-term, sustainable
relationships. First, tribal sovereignty claims are central to these
lobbying efforts. In each of the case studies, tribes made arguments
about how the existing policy undermined their status as separate
sovereign governments and they sought legislation that reaffirmed
that status. Tribes lobbied to protect and promote their governmentto-government relationship with the federal government.
Second, tribes exhibited tremendous persistence in their lobbying efforts. Consistent with earlier studies on tribal advocacy, the
case studies demonstrate the incredible tenacity of tribes in
advancing their interests over time.318 Tribes lobbied for the
Indian Tribal Tax Governmental Status Act for almost a decade in
the face of opposition from the Department of the Treasury.319 But
their persistence paid off. Congress enacted the partial Oliphant fix
in the VAWA Reauthorization of 2013 much more quickly (in less
than four years), but Native advocates had spent decades laying
the groundwork for a successful legislative campaign and expanded their mobilization efforts when the House refused to pass
an acceptable bill.320 Thus, the case studies confirm earlier research
findings that Indian tribes are in it for the long term and willing to
continue advocating even in the face of opposition and defeat.321
Third, tribes develop sophisticated, long-term strategies to
pursue their goals and demonstrate a willingness to adapt their
strategies over time. Tribal advocates crafted a multilevel strategy
for educating the public and legislators about the importance of a
limited Oliphant fix that targeted policymakers at the federal and
international level.322 When the House of Representatives removed
the jurisdictional provisions from the bill it passed, the NCAI
Taskforce on Violence Against Women responded by increasing
its efforts to mobilize supporters. Similarly, tribes lobbied across

318. EVANS, supra note 32, at 74.
319. See supra Part II. Tribes do not always face as much opposition or delay as they

did in the cases presented here. Most bills initiated by tribes that are enacted are enacted in
one to two congressional sessions.
320. See supra Part II.
321. EVANS, supra note 32, at 74 (noting how tribes built relationships with federal
bureaucrats and used a slow, long-term approach to making policies more beneficial
to them).
322. See supra Part II.
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committees to convince Congress to enact a self-governance
demonstration project as part of the 1988 ISDEAA amendments.323
When they failed to persuade Congress to mandate permanent appropriations for contract support costs, they turned to the courts,
demonstrating their ability to shift strategies as necessary.324 The
case studies suggest that the adaptability of tribal advocates
enables them to foster tribal resilience through lobbying.
Fourth, tribes engage in relationship and coalition building
within and outside of Indian country as part of their lobbying
strategies. The case studies confirm previous studies finding that
tribes build relationships with congressional staffers by continually interacting with them to revise and improve policies.325
The clearest example of this emerges in the case study of the
ISDEAA, in which tribes collaborated closely with congressional
staffers over several decades to ensure legislative oversight and
reform of the self-determination contracting and self-governance
compacting processes.326 Moreover, the case studies expand on
these findings by indicating that tribes also develop alliances with
other groups as a way of promoting tribal sovereignty. For
example, the NCAI Taskforce cultivated relationships with a
broad spectrum of women’s rights and human rights groups as
part of their efforts to protect Native women by restoring tribal
criminal jurisdiction. This intentional fostering of alliances among
tribes, with other interest groups and with government officials,
has helped tribes to protect their sovereignty over time.
IV. LESSONS FROM INDIAN COUNTRY: IMPLICATIONS
FOR FEDERAL INDIAN LAW AND ADVOCACY STUDIES
This Part explores some of the broader implications of this
exploratory research for federal Indian law and interest group and
advocacy studies. Section IV.A highlights the new and important
questions that the case studies raise for the study of federal Indian
law. Section IV.B looks beyond federal Indian law to consider the

323.
324.
325.
326.

See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
EVANS, supra note 32, at 74–75.
See supra Part II.
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implications of this research on interest group and advocacy
studies more generally.
A. Tribal Advocacy and Federal Indian law
The implications of this research for federal Indian law are
significant. In a world in which tribes continue to face threats to
their survival and sovereignty,327 scholars need to develop more
detailed and comprehensive understandings of the various,
sophisticated ways in which tribes influence the creation, enactment, and implementation of federal Indian law and policy. The
case studies contribute to this larger project by furnishing some
basic information about the myriad ways in which tribes engage
in lobbying strategies and how those ways compare to interest
groups more generally. They also indicate some important
directions for future research in this area.
The case studies enhance existing knowledge about tribal
legislative advocacy by presenting a broader view of how
American Indians and tribes engage in lobbying. Indian nations
have long advocated for their own survival and used multiple
strategies in doing so. The case studies here simply attempt to
describe some of tribes’ more recent efforts. They confirm that
American Indians often act like interest groups.328 Previous
studies have demonstrated how American Indians contribute to
electoral campaigns329 and build relationships with legislators330
similar to interest groups. Like interest groups, Indian tribes craft
sophisticated strategies in response to various opportunities and
constraints.331 Tribes displayed a willingness to shift strategies
over time in response to changes in the political environment. For
example, tribal advocates changed their strategy by more
aggressively advocating for a limited Oliphant fix in the VAWA
reauthorization after they learned that the Department of Justice
327. See, e.g., FORCED FEDERALISM, supra note 16, at 3–8; see also A Bill to Abrogate
the Sovereign Immunity of Indian Tribes as a Defense in Inter Partes Review of Patents,
S. 1948, 115th Cong. (2017).
328. State Lobbying Registrations, supra note 32, at 5; Post-Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
Era, supra note 26, at 129.
329. Post-Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Era, supra note 26, at 129.
330. EVANS, supra note 32, at 74; GROSS, supra note 46, at 82–84.
331. LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE, supra note 60, at 110–11.
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supported restoring tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
committing intimate partner violence to tribal governments.332
Similar to interest groups, Indian nations use lobbying for various
purposes, including to leverage institutional relationships, build
support for an issue, educate the public, develop credibility with
government officials, and encourage legislative oversight.333 They
have engaged in a variety of influencing behaviors, including but
not limited to, disseminating research, building coalitions, working with allies, mobilizing at the grass roots level, and testifying
before congressional hearings.334
By emphasizing how tribes act like interest groups, the case
studies show that Indian nations view Congress as an arena of
contestation and lobby legislators to influence the creation and
implementation of federal Indian law.335 They reveal that Congress, not just the courts, is an important venue for the crafting of
federal Indian law and policy. These findings run contrary to the
bulk of federal Indian law scholarship, which has traditionally
focused on court decisions and taken a top-down approach to
studying federal Indian law.336 The case studies suggest that
Indian nations are active participants in the creation and
implementation of federal Indian law across a range of institutions. Future studies should investigate the various roles that
Indian nations play across institutions in the initiation, development, and implementation of federal Indian law.
The case studies leave several important questions unanswered. The case studies suggest that tribes exercise some
influence in initiating and implementing federal Indian policy. But
the extent of this influence remains largely unknown. The case
studies are not representative, so research is needed to determine
whether these case studies are indicative of more general patterns
332. See supra Section II.C.2.
333. LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE, supra note 60, at 78, 110–11; Making Strategic

Choices, supra note 36, at 948–58.
334. LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE, supra note 60, at 150–51 (noting the various
tactics used by lobbyists). Previous studies have also documented American Indians using
some of these tactics. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 38; Making Strategic Choices, supra note 36,
at 948–58.
335. HANSEN & SKOPEK, supra note 32, at 212.
336. Notable exceptions to this trend include, but are not limited to, Berger, supra note
38, and INDIAN LAW STORIES (Carole Goldberg et al. eds., 2011).
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and trends in tribal influence. Several questions still need to be
answered: How successful are American Indians in influencing
the enactment of federal and state laws and policies beneficial to
them? Are some tribes more successful than others? What
conditions improve their chances of success? These questions
merit systematic investigation and will provide important insights
into how and when Indian nations can craft successful advocacy strategies.
Moreover, this research has only investigated a few cases of
tribes using advocacy to argue for legislation beneficial to them.
Most likely, Indian nations are using lobbying in other ways as
well. For example, this research has not considered what happens
when tribes lobby against a policy change. To develop a complete
picture of Indian legislative advocacy, future studies should
examine how, when, and why tribes use advocacy to oppose or
defeat legislation. These future investigations should also explore
the efficacy of tribal opposition. For example, how successful are
Indian nations at preventing the enactment of laws and policies
detrimental to them? Under what conditions are tribes able to
defeat laws and policies detrimental to them? This preliminary,
descriptive study indicates the need for more research in this
understudied area.
B. Interest Group and Advocacy Studies
The research provides insights beyond federal Indian law to
interest group and advocacy studies more generally. First, the case
studies indicate that Indian nations behave similarly to interest
groups with some notable and important exceptions. As noted
previously, Indian nations frequently engage in many of the same
behaviors as interest groups, including initiating legislation,
campaigning at the grassroots level, testifying before congressional
committees, building relationships with other interest groups and
government officials, and drafting legislative language.337
Indian nations, however, do not always act like interest
groups, and their divergent behaviors may provide insights into
important differences among interest groups and how they lobby.
337. LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE, supra note 60, at 155.
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In contrast to recent lobbying studies that report that interest
groups challenging the status quo emphasize the positive aspects
of the proposed policy,338 my case studies suggest that Indian
tribes also regularly highlighted the negative, harmful consequences of existing policies in arguing for policy change. Indian
nations repeatedly testified about the detrimental effects of not
extending the same tax rules to tribal governments as other
governments, failing to recognize the criminal jurisdiction of
Indian tribes, and the shortfalls in contract support costs.339 My
findings, thus, suggest the need to pay closer attention to the
arguments being made by interest groups. Moreover, my findings
may indicate that the arguments made by groups challenging the
status quo may depend on their relationship to the policies being
challenged. In my case studies, the group challenging the policy
was the group harmed by it. Thus, they were uniquely positioned
to make cogent arguments about the negative impacts of existing
policies. Different interest groups may make different arguments
based on their relationship to the policy.
Second, my research expands existing understandings of how
groups influence the political process.340 Similar to previous
studies, it highlights interactions among interest groups and
legislators.341 Unlike most previous studies, my research closely
follows targeted advocacy on a specific policy proposal and thus
allows for the tracking of influence over time.342 It documents the
arguments and proposals Indian nations advanced to exercise
influence on a specific policy proposal at different stages of the
338. Id. at 140.
339. See supra Part II.
340. Scholars disagree on the ability of interest groups to influence the political

process. For a discussion of this debate, see BURSTEIN, supra note 60, at 6–16. They have
struggled to show empirically how groups influence legislators through lobbying. See, e.g.,
BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 60, at 36 (“Scholars have long attempted to observe and
document the exercise of influence in politics. They have yet to succeed.”).
341. BURSTEIN, supra note 60, at 100–06; JOHN R. WRIGHT, INTEREST GROUPS &
CONGRESS: LOBBYING, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND INFLUENCE 75–97 (1996); Holly J. McCammon,
et al., How Movements Win: Gendered Opportunity Structures and U.S. Women’s Suffrage
Movements, 1866 to 1919, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 49 (2001) [hereinafter How Movements Win];
Holly J. McCammon, et al., Movement Framing and Discursive Opportunity Structures: The
Political Successes of the U.S. Women’s Jury Movements, 72 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 725 (2007)
[hereinafter Movement Framing and Discursive Opportunity Structures].
342. BURSTEIN, supra note 60, at 102–03.
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legislative process. For example, tribal advocates played key roles
in the initial development and drafting of legislative proposals in
all three cases and influenced the amending processes in the
VAWA and ISDEAA cases. This close tracking of the legislative
proposal as it developed allowed me to trace how legislators
responded to these proposals and arguments. The data, thus,
shows how members of Congress responded to tribal arguments
and the interactive dialogue among tribes, legislators, and
agencies in the legislative process. My research builds on the
insight made by earlier scholars that influence emerges through
interactions among interest groups, legislators, and bureaucrats
by suggesting that influence may be revealed through close
documentation of these interactions and linking them to policy
outcomes.343 For example, Indian nations appear to have
influenced the 1988 ISDEAA Amendments, which incorporated
many of their suggested revisions. Future studies should
investigate similar interactions in other cases to improve current
understandings of how influence works.
Third, this research contributes to a growing literature on the
role and influence of marginalized groups in the political process.
It expands knowledge about how marginalized groups may
engage in the political process by exploring the experiences of one
group. Contrary to popular narratives about the political
powerlessness of marginalized groups, the data suggests that
even groups thought to be powerless may occasionally exercise
influence in the political process. This finding complicates
contemporary debates over how to understand and measure
power and powerlessness for doctrinal purposes.344 It suggests
that the dichotomy between powerful and powerless used to
identify suspect classes in the existing equal protection doctrine
may oversimplify reality. Groups may exercise power in some
contexts but not others. Thus, my research challenges scholars and
343. Id. at 100–06; WRIGHT, supra note 341, at 75–97; How Movements Win, supra note
341, at 49; Movement Framing and Discursive Opportunity Structures, supra note 341, at 725.
344. Bertrall L. Ross, II & Su Li, Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class Determinations
and the Poor, 104 CAL. L. REV. 323 (2016) (arguing for a holistic definition of a group’s power
in applications of equal protection doctrine); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Political
Powerlessness, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1527 (2015) (trying to theorize and operationalize political
powerlessness to identify suspect classes for equal protection purposes).

1228

001.CARLSON_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1159

5/6/19 2:14 PM

Lobbying as a Strategy for Tribal Resilience

judges to think more carefully about what power is as well as
how, when, and why groups use it. It suggests that more
contextual approaches to understanding political power may be
more accurate. My research indicates a need for future studies
investigating how, when, and why other marginalized groups
exercise power in the political process and identifying the
different conditions leading to power and powerlessness.
Finally, my research expands on existing understandings of
the “important and incompletely understood role” of interest
groups in congressional oversight.345 The case study on the
ISDEAA in particular builds on earlier studies investigating the
role and influence of interest groups in congressional oversight of
agency action. Like previous studies, my research confirms that
interest group lobbying may influence legislative control of the
bureaucracy.346 Indian nations, like interest groups, have sounded
the fire alarm to encourage members of Congress to rein in
agencies straying from legislative mandates.347 My research
expands on earlier studies by suggesting a dialectic relationship
between interest groups and legislators in oversight processes. It
demonstrates how members of Congress may actively rely on and
collaborate with an interest group in overseeing policy implementation.348 It shows that this relationship may not be unidirectional
with interest groups always sounding the alarm. At least in the
case of monitoring implementation of the ISDEAA, members of
Congress actively turned to Indian nations for guidance on how to
curb agency discretion. This finding suggests a more cyclical
relationship between members of Congress and interest groups
and that interest groups may exercise more influence in the
oversight process than previously thought. Future research is
needed to test this finding across a wider range of cases.
Moreover, unlike earlier oversight studies, which suggest that
legislative reform is an uncommon result of lobbying,349 my
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

Hall & Miler, supra note 307, at 1002.
Id. at 1003; Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 307, at 228.
See supra Part II.
Hall & Miler, supra note 307, at 1003.
Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 307, at 228 (“These groups can influence policy
by their threat to sound a fire alarm, but in general they cannot achieve their most
preferred policy outcome.”).
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research indicates that lobbying may inform policy formation and
lead to the crafting of better policies. As exploratory research, this
finding is less important than the direction in which it points.
Future work should investigate a wider range of cases to determine when and how interest group influence extends beyond
sounding fire alarms and providing information to engaging
actively in revising policies.
CONCLUSION
Indian peoples have demonstrated remarkable resilience since
Europeans arrived in the New World over five hundred years ago.
This Article has explored how Indian tribes have used lobbying to
protect their tribal sovereignty, build their institutions, and
maintain control over their lands and natural resources during the
Tribal Self-Determination Era. Through case studies, it has
demonstrated how tribes have harnessed strategies used by
interest groups within the American political system to advocate
for federal Indian laws and policies beneficial to them. Tribes have
pushed back against potential encroachments on their sovereignty, initiated new policies to ensure their continued survival,
and advocated for implementation of programs that foster their
development as tribal governments.

1230

